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STRUCTURAL FREE EXERCISE
Mary Ann Glendon*
and Raul F. Yanes**
INTRODUCTION

For some three decades, beginning in the mid-1950s, the Supreme
Court lavished so much attention on certain political and civil liberties
that it has become common to speak of a "rights revolution" as having
taken place in constitutional law. The American legal landscape has
been profoundly transformed by the heightened protection the Warren
and Burger Courts accorded to the rights of women and minorities to
nondiscriminatory treatment and of criminal defendants to fair procedures; by the remarkable development of privacy law; and by the high
priority the Court has given to freedom of speech and of the press.
The major landmarks of the judicial rights revolution - Brown v.
Board of Education, 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 2 Baker v. Carr, 3 Griswold v.
Connecticut, 4 New York Times v. Sullivan, 5 - have not only affected
the way Americans live, but the way we envision the problem of ordering our lives together in a large heterogeneous republic. Over the
same period, however, the Court significantly constricted protection of
freedom of religion through a narrow interpretation of "free exercise"
and an expansive view of what kind of governmental activity amounts
to "establishment" of religion. 6 Whatever the position of religious
freedom on the Court's "Honor Roll of Superior Rights" 7 in those
years, it was not at or near the top.
With changes in the composition of the Court, a majority of the
• Professor of Law, Harvard University. B.A. 1959, J.D. 1961, M.C.L. 1963, University of
Chicago. - Ed.
•• Clerk to Judge John L. Coffey of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. A.B.
1987, Dartmouth; J.D. 1991, Harvard. - Ed.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
4. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
6. In our view, the religion language of the First Amendment is in the service of a single
fundamental freedom, referred to in that amendment as the "free exercise" of religion. See infra
notes 308-11 and accompanying text. In this article, therefore, we use the terms free exercise of
religion, religious liberty, and freedom of religion interchangeably.
7. The expression is Henry Abraham's. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE
COURT: CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 74 (5th ed. 1988).
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current members seems disposed to give some reconsideration to the
Religion Clause8 jurisprudence, a body of law that has been described
on all sides, and even by Justices themselves, as unprincipled, incoherent, and unworkable. 9 Whether this process of clarification will lead
to increased protection for the freedom of religion, however, is an open
question. For, though most of the current Justices separately have expressed discontent with the state of the law in the church-state area in
dissents and concurring opinions over the years, the Court as a whole
seems to be veering toward a posture of reflexive deference to the
elected branches of government where religion issues are concerned. 10
In Part I of this article, we analyze the development of case law
interpreting the religious freedom language of the First Amendment
from the 1940s to the eve of the rights revolution as a casualty of the
piecemeal approach to incorporation, compounded by a series of judicial lapses and oversights. Part II deals with the fate of the Religion
Clause in the era of the rights revolution, when the free exercise and
establishment provisions were deployed in the service of a constitutional agenda to which they were, in themselves, largely peripheral.
The current period of doctrinal change is the subject of Part Ill, where
the implicatibns of the emerging deferential approach for religious
freedom are ~xplored. In Part IV we argue that a holistic, structural
approach to the text is necessary if the Court is to develop a workable,
coherent, church-state jurisprudence for our pluralistic, liberal, democratic society. If rigid separationism is not to be succeeded by an
equally mechanical form of deference, the Court must now grapple
seriously with the formidable interpretive problems that were overlooked or given short shrift in the past. The task is an urgent one, for
it concerns nothing less than the cultural foundations of our experiment in ordered liberty.
8. Since a major purpose of this article is to criticize the interpretive process through which
the First Amendment came to be understood as embodying two separate values at odds with one
another, see infra notes 59-70 and accompanying text, we depart from the standard practice of
referring to that amendment's religion language as containing two clauses. We treat the First
Amendment as containing a single, coherent Religion Clause whose establishment and free exercise provisions are both in the service of the same fundamental value: religious freedom.
9. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1155 (2d ed. 1988); Michael
W. McConnell, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Where is the Supreme Court
Heading?, 32 CATH. LAW. 187, 187-88 (1989); Mark V. Tushnet, The Constitution of Religio11,
18 CONN. L. REV. 701, 702 (1986); Developments in the Law: Religion and the State, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1606, 1609-10 (1987) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]; see also Walz v. Tax
Comm., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970) (Burger, C.J.); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
10. The Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990), strongly
lends itself to this interpretation. See infra Part III.
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INCORPORATION AND THE FAILURE OF LEGAL IMAGINATION

The Supreme Court's modern Religion Clause jurisprudence grows
out of the Court's decision in the 1940s to apply the religion language
of the First Amendment against the states. Before 1940, the Court
"had never upheld a claim of free exercise of religion, had never found
any governmental practice to be an establishment of religion, and had
never applied the religion clauses of the First Amendment to the
states." 11 The decisions of the 1940s that gave new legal life to the
religion language of the Bill of Rights were part of the decades-long
process that has come to be known as incorporation. As early as 1925
in Git/ow v. New York, 12 the Supreme Court began to hold that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required the states
to abide by portions of the first eight amendments. But the Court offered no systematic account of this historic constitutional transition
until 1937 when, in Palko v. Connecticut, 13 Justice Cardozo undertook
to explain why it had made sense to take a piecemeal approach, rather
than to incorporate the entire Bill of Rights.
The teaching of Palko is that the Bill of Rights contains an implied
hierarchy of constitutional values. According to Cardozo, certain
rights are so "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and " 'so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental.' " 14 These especially important "fundamental" rights
are to be distinguished from various other rights (such as the double
jeopardy provision involved in Palko) in the absence of which
"[j]ustice ... would not perish." 15 The concept of due process, Cardozo explained, required that the former, but not the latter, be made
binding on the states. Cardozo did not suggest any more sophisticated
ranking than "in" and "out," nor did he offer an exhaustive catalog of
the rights that ought to be "in." But he made it plain that freedom of
speech, thought, and religion were among them. 16 Of these, Cardozo's
rhetoric implied, speech was the most essential. The freedom of
thought and speech, he wrote, was the "matrix, the indispensable con11. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE xiii (1987). Prior
to the incorporation period, the Court had considered only three important Religion Clause
cases: Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908) (upholding tuition grants for Sioux Indians in
Catholic schools); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (upholding federal funding of a
Catholic hospital in the District of Columbia); and Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)
(upholding federal prohibition of polygamy even where polygamy was based on religious belief).
12. 268 U.S. 652 {1925).
13. 302 U.S. 319 {1937).
14. 302 U.S. at 325 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 {1934)).
15. 302 U.S. at 326.
16. 302 U.S. at 324.
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dition, of nearly every other form of freedom." 17
The Court's first explicit application of the First Amendment's
religion language against the states came three years after Palko in
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 18 a case involving a citizen's speech rights as
well as his religious liberty. Cantwell, a Jehovah's Witness, had been
proselytizing in a largely Catholic neighborhood by, among other
things, playing an anti-Catholic record, when he was arrested and
charged with a breach of the peace. The Court had no difficulty on
these facts in deciding that the free exercise of religion was a right so
fundamental that the First Amendment's religion language must restrain the states as well as the federal government. The Court overturned Cantwell's conviction, ruling in effect that the state's interest in
keeping the public peace did not outweigh Cantwell's right to proclaim and spread his religious beliefs. There can be little doubt that
the strength of Cantwell's free exercise claim was augmented by the
free speech interest with which it was inextricably bound. 19
The Court continued to develop free exercise jurisprudence in a
series of decisions following Cantwell. In these early cases, the Court
implicitly employed a balancing approach, weighing the infringement
on an individual's interests in being free of state interference against
the burden that an exemption would place on the state's regulatory
interests. In West Virginia Board ofEducation v. Barnette, 20 for example, the free exercise and speech interests of Jehovah's Witnesses
(whose religion forbade them to worship graven images) prevailed
over a state law mandating recital of the Pledge of Allegiance in public
schools. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 21 however, the Court found that a
state's child protection laws outweighed the free exercise and family
autonomy interests asserted by a Jehovah's Witness who had been
convicted of aiding her young ward to violate state law by selling religious leaflets on the public streets.
The issue of the applicability of the First Amendment's establishment language to the states did not reach the Court until after it had
decided several cases under the free exercise provision. In these early
free exercise cases, the Court had no occasion to consider in any depth
the connections and interplay between the free exercise and establish17. 302 U.S. at 326-27.
18. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
19. Justice Roberts' opinion for the Court made the connection expressly, noting that the
Constitution declares "that the free exercise of religion be not prohibited and that freedom to
communicate information and opinion be not abridged." 310 U.S. at 307.
20. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
21. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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ment language of the First Amendment. Having proceeded for several
years as though free exercise and establishment had no necessary connection with one another, the Court by 1947 was susceptible to the
argument that the establishment provision represented its own independent set of values. When the question of the incorporation of the
establishment provision reached the Court in that year, the stage was
set for the Justices to adopt a controversial and ahistorical interpretation of that language. .
Everson v. Board ofEducation 22 arose from the challenge by a New
Jersey taxpayer to the state's practice of permitting parents of private
school students (including students attending church-run schools) to
be reimbursed for the costs of transportation on public buses to and
from school. Today, Everson is chiefly remembered not for its holding
that the transportation reimbursement program at issue was constitutionally valid, but for its wholehearted espousal of a particular view of
the essential purpose of the Constitution's religion language. It was a
view that Justice Frankfurter had advanced in a 1943 dissent, where
he declined to join the Court's decision that a state may not tax the
sale by Jehovah's Witnesses of religious literature. Explaining why he
believed that the free exercise claim should not have been upheld in
that case, Justice Frankfurter claimed that to exempt the proselytizers
from taxation offended "the most important of all aspects of religious
freedom in this country, namely, that of the separation of church and
state. " 23 Though the Court majority had been unwilling on the earlier
occasion to permit separationism to govern its interpretation of the
free exercise provision, it made it central to its establishment provision
approach in Everson.
In so doing, the Court elevated the separation of church and state
to the status of a constitutional end in itself. This historic move was as
unreflective as it was fateful. The various opinion writers in Everson
seemed unaware of the free exercise implications of their acceptance of
separation as an independent constitutional value. As a matter of judicial craftsmanship, it is striking in retrospect to observe how little intellectual curiosity the members of the Court demons,trated in the
challenge presented by the task of adapting, for application to the
states, language that had long served to protect the states against the
federal government. For the historical record is clear that when the
religion language was first adopted it was designed to restrain the federal government from interfering with the variety of state-church ar22. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
23. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 140 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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rangements then in place. 24 Incorporation of this provision therefore
required some thought about the purpose of the religious freedom language and its relation to the Fourteenth Amendment within a modem
regulatory state. Akhil Amar, writing in the Yale Law Journal, has
suggested that it was Justice Black's intense desire to advance the incorporation project that inclined him to "gloss over" this especially
complex problem. 25 Whatever the motive, a fateful step was taken
without offering reasons and justification. Moreover, by setting the
interpretation of "establishment" on a different course from that of
"free exercise," the Justices in Everson created an appearance of conflict between two provisions that history and text suggest were meant
to work together in the service of religious liberty. 26
Justice Black, writing for the Court, used language that ideological
plaintiffs later seized upon to further a program of eliminating virtually all forms of governmental assistance to religion. 27 The establishment provision, he asserted, as though it were apodictic,
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set
up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.... No tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to
teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect a "wall of
separation between church and state. " 28

Commentators have since exposed the lack of foundation for Justice Black's novel theory of the original intent of the establishment
provision. 29 But the introduction of Jefferson's "wall" metaphor into
24. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding ofFree Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990).
25. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill ofRights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1160 (1991).
26. For criticism of the tendency to treat the free exercise and establishment provisions in
isolation from one another, see generally: Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Pm. L. REV. 673, 674-75 (1980); John H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CAL. L.
REV. 847, 848 (1984); McConnell, supra note 9, at 195. See infra Part IV for discussion of the
Framers' intent.
27. For a discussion of the main groups that initiated, financed, or participated in Establish·
ment Clause litigation, see NOONAN, supra note 11, at 374-75, and RICHARD E. MORGAN, DJSA·
BUNG AMERICA: THE "RIGHTS INDUSTRY" IN OUR TIME 33-41 (1984).
28. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 15-16 (citation omitted).
29. See ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J, EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELi·
GIOUS LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES ch. 2 (1990);
Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 26 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 933 (1986). See also infra notes 298-306 and accompanying text.
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constitutional analysis was to have profound consequences. 30 Decades
later, after attempts to derive principles from the metaphor had
wrought considerable havoc in church-state law, Justice Rehnquist reviewed the historical record, summed up the findings of scholars, and
commented:
It is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken
understanding of constitutional history, but unfortunately the Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted with Jefferson's misleading
metaphor for nearly 40 years. Thomas Jefferson was of course in France
at the time the constitutional Amendments known as the Bill of Rights
were passed by Congress and ratified by the States. His letter to the
Danbury Baptist Association [where the expression appeared] was a
short note of courtesy, written 14 years after the Amendments were
passed by Congress. He would seem to any detached observer as a less
than ideal source of contemporary history as to the meaning of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. 31

Jefferson himself, it appears, acknowledged the propriety of a variety of governmental endorsements of religion at the state level,
notwithstanding the views he expressed in the letter to the Danbury
Baptists. 32 As for the rest of the Founders, their opinions regarding
the proper role of religion in the new constitutional order were diverse.
Some, like Jefferson, were generally unsympathetic to organized religion, while others, like John Adams, considered vital religions essential to the proper functioning of the polity. 33
Justice Black's sketchy "history" in support of his separationist interpretation also included a reference to disestablishment in colonial
Virginia. 34 Black neglected to mention, however, that church-state arrangements in the original thirteen states were as diverse as the views
of the Founders, with Virginia representing but one model on a spectrum that ranged from disestablishment through official state establishment, with various cooperative arrangements in between. 35
Although the historical record resists simplistic characterization, it
contains no support at all for the view that the establishment language
commanded a complete separation between government and religion
30. The first reference to Jefferson's metaphor by the Supreme Court occurred in Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879).
31. Wallace v. Jalfree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
32. Amar, supra note 25, at 1159; Richard F. Duncan, Religious Civil Rights in Public High
Schools: The Supreme Court Speaks on Equal Access, 24 IND. L. REV. 111, 132-33 (1991).
33. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 29, at ch. 2; see also NOONAN, supra note 11, at 93126.
34. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1947).
35. NOONAN, supra note 11, at 127-67; Wallace v. Jalfree, 472 U.S. 38, 99 n.4 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also SANFORD COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA
14-15 (1902).
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at the national level, not to mention the state level, to which the First
Amendment did not even apply then. The leading champions of
separationism as a good in itself were not the Founders, but later commentators whose vision of rights owed more to John Stuart Mill than
to John Locke. 36
As for the sweeping dicta in Everson that all government laws or
expenditures that aid religion in any way are invalid, Justice Black
himself admitted that it could not be taken literally. State court decisions, he observed, had shown "the difficulty in drawing the line between tax legislation which provides funds for the welfare of the
general public and that which is designed to support institutions which
teach religion." 37 To the dismay of dissenting Justices Jackson, Rutledge, Frankfurter, and Burton, Black's opinion for the majority in
Everson drew that line so as to permit the bus transportation scheme
in that case to survive. Black acknowledged the "possibility that some
of the children might not be sent to the church schools if the parents
were compelled to pay their children's bus fares out of their own pockets when transportation to a public school would have been paid for by
the State." 38 He likened the transportation reimbursement program,
however, to services like fire and police protection which he deemed
"indisputably marked off from the religious function" of the institutions they aided. 39 To deprive religious institutions of such services,
he wrote,
is obviously not the purpose of the First Amendment. That Amendment
requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious
believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power iS no more to be used so as to handicap religions than
it is to favor them. 40

Justices Jackson and Rutledge found it impossible to understand
why Justice Black did not apply the separationist principles accepted
in Everson to the facts before the Court. "[T]he undertones of the
opinion, advoeating complete and uncompromising separation of
Church from State," Jackson wrote, "seem utterly discordant with its
conclusion yielding support to their commingling in educational matters."41 Justice Rutledge's dissent insisted that the purpose of the
First Amendment's religion language was "to create a complete and
36. Regarding the advance of Millean understandings of rights in America, see MARY ANN
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE chs. 2-3 (1991).
37. Everson, 330 U.S. at 14.
38. 330 U.S. at 17.
39. 330 U.S. at 18.
40. 330 U.S. at 18.
41. 330 U.S. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion." 42 Rutledge pointed a judicial finger, for the benefit
of future plaintiffs, toward the areas that, in his view, were most in
need of reform:
[A]part from efforts to inject religious training or exercises and sectarian
issues into the public schools, the only serious surviving threat to maintaining that complete and permanent separation of religion and civil
power which the First Amendment commands is through use of the taxing power to support religion, religious establishments, or establishments
having a religious foundation whatever their form or special religious
function. 43

The Rutledge opinion in Everson affords an instructive glimpse of
an influential assumption at the heart of much separationist thinking
about the establishment language: the assumption that religion is or
ought to be a "wholly private" matter. Rutledge took it as self-evident
that "[t]he realm of religious training and belief remains, as the
. Amendment made it, the kingdom of the individual man and his
God," and that "[i]t should be kept inviolably private."44 This theme
was to recur frequently in church-state opinions over the years. For
many Justices, the only constitutionally cognizable religious experiences were those that implicated the solitary individual. A subtheme
was that religious experience is separable from the rest of human life
and activity.45
In sum, Everson committed the Court to a cluster of problematic
positions. The only disagreement was on how vigorously the Court
should pursue the separationist program. With little or no support
from text, history, or tradition, the members of the Everson Court
braided into the Religion Clause the notions that the establishment
provision was meant to create a "wall of separation" between religion
and the government, that it was to be broadly construed to prohibit all
government aid to religion, and that government was required to be
strictly neutral as between religion and nonreligion. The Court thus
lent its prestige and sponsorship to a controversial secularizing program without even acknowledging what in hindsight seem like obvious
and serious interpretive problems: What is a religion? What does it
mean to "prohibit" religious exercise? Is there one Religion Clause or
two? Does the establishment language embody a value in tension with
that of free exercise, or is the ban on establishment of religion to be
42.
43.
44.
45.

330 U.S. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
330 U.S. at 44.
330 U.S. at 57-58.
See infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
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interpreted so as to promote free exercise? Is language that was intended to protect state arrangements regarding religion from federal
intervention a proper subject for "incorporation" at all?
Once the Court had given broad scope to the concept of establishment, it was inevitable that a host of "Establishment Clause" problems
would be precipitated, especially as the size and reach of government
expanded and the structure of American federalism changed. In the
1940s, state and local governments were already beginning to lose
some of their autonomy. They would lose much more as Truman's
Fair Deal and Johnson's Great Society succeeded Roosevelt's New
Deal. As the apparatus of the regulatory state penetrated every American town and city, the occasions for government and religion to intersect multiplied. The separationist dogma of Everson seemed to require
that where government advanced, religion must retreat. 46 Schools, especially, became frequent flash points of conflict as the Court elaborated and applied its notion that all government aid to religion
constituted establishment.
The Court, in short, produced its broad view of the establishment
language at just the historical moment when its application would become increasingly difficult. But in the first establishment case after
Everson to reach the Court, the majority Justices continued to ignore
many of the issues presented by the approach to which they had committed themselves. In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 47 the Court began to implement the separationist principles it had
announced but failed to apply two years before in Everson. McCollum
involved American ecumenism in its infancy in the form of a cooperative effort among members of the Jewish, Roman Catholic, and several
Protestant communities in Champaign, Illinois, to facilitate the provision of religious education for children who were attending public
schools. Such efforts across the. country were prompted, no doubt, by
social changes that had endowed the state's near-monopoly over primary and secondary education with new and enlarged significance.
Young children were now spending most of their waking hours during
the school year in environments structured and supervised by public
employees. The traditional generic Protestantism of most American
public schools had never been meant to serve as a substitute for moral
and religious education. It was, in any event, decreasingly suited to
the needs of religiously diverse student bodies. Protestants, Catholics,
46. Richard John Neuhaus, A New Order of Religious FNedom, FIRST THINGS (forthcoming
1992).
47. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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and Jews thus began to explore strategies for providing religious education to public school students.
In 1940, the groups involved in the McCollum case formed a voluntary association called the Champaign, Council on Religious Education, and secured permission from the local Board of Education to
hold weekly classes in their respective religions on the premises of
public schools. The classes, lasting from thirty to forty-five minutes,
were taught in three separate groups by Protestant teachers, Catholic
priests, and a Jewish rabbi. These instructors were paid by the Council, but were subject to the approval and supervision of the superintendent of schools. The classes were open to children in grades four to
nine whose parents signed printed cards requesting that their children
be permitted to attend. Students who did not take religious instruction were not released from school, but were required to leave the
classrooms being used for that purpose and to pursue their studies
elsewhere in the school building. 48
For the majority, this was an easy case. Justice Black, again writing for the Court, used the separationist principles of Everson to strike
down the program. In a short opinion, he concluded that "[t]his is
beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups to spread their
faith." 49 The state in this case transgressed the principle of separation
by helping "to provide pupils for their religious classes through use of
the State's compulsory public school machinery." 50
Justice Frankfurter's separate opinion, joined by Justices Jackson,
Rutledge, and Burton, sounded two additional themes that were to
play important roles in the Supreme Court's efforts to arrive at solutions to vexing church-state problems - the specter of sectarian strife
and the need for fair treatment of members of numerically small religious groups and nonbelievers. 51 He alluded, first, to the threat that
religious divisiveness might pose to the unique mission of America's
public schools: "Designed to serve as perhaps the most powerful
agency for promoting cohesion among a heterogeneous democratic
people, the public school must keep scrupulously free from entanglement in the strife of sects." 52 Then, explaining why the optional character of the religion classes in McCollum did not save the program, he
pointed out that children belonging to nonparticipating sects might
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

333 U.S. at 207-09.
333 U.S. at 210.
333 U.S. at 212.
See infra notes 59-69, 87-88, 160-61, 175, 185-95 and accompanying text.
333 U.S. at 216-17 (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion).
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"have inculcated in them a feeling of separatism when the school
should be the training ground for habits of community, or they will
have religious instruction in a faith which is not that of their
parents." 53
Justice Jackson, though concurring, was critical of the majority's
abstract, broad language, and of the regulatory character of its ruling.
Cautioning against excessive zeal in applying the separationist interpretation, he observed, "for good or for ill, nearly everything in our
culture worth transmitting, everything which gives meaning to life, is
saturated with religious influences, derived from paganism, Judaism,
Christianity ... and other faiths accepted by a large part of the world's
peoples." 54 Belatedly, he raised concerns about the simple transposition of antiestablishment principles to the states. The courts, he advised, should accord citizens and local governments a measure of
flexibility to deal appropriately with America's diverse conditions:
To lay down a sweeping constitutional doctrine ... apparently approved
by the Court, applicable alike to all school boards . . . "to immediately
adopt and enforce rules ... prohibiting all instruction in and teaching of
religious education in all public schools," is to decree a ... rigid ...
standard for countless school boards representing and serving highly localized groups which not only differ from each other but which themselves from time to time change attitudes. 55

Only the lone dissenter, Justice Reed, had begun to worry about
the implications of Everson. Reed suggested that the Court, by permitting the wall metaphor to serve as a substitute for a reasoning process, was shirking the judicial role. "A rule of law," he warned,
"should not be drawn from a figure of speech." 56 The establishment
provision, he insisted, did "not bar every friendly gesture between
church and state. It is not an absolute prohibition against every conceivable situation where the two may work together, any more than
the other provisions of the First Amendment - free speech, free press
- are absolutes." 57 Reed noted, too, that Frankfurter's evocation of
sectarian strife was inapposite to the facts of the case at hand, which
involved grass-roots cooperation among the sects in an attempt to
solve a common problem. The record suggested, he pointed out, that
the program had operated in a way opposite to that feared by Frankfurter: "The testimony of the religious education teachers, the secular
teachers ... and the many children, mostly from Protestant families,
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

333
333
333
333
333

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

at
at
at
at
at

227-28.
236 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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who either took or did not take religious education courses, is to the
effect that religious education classes have fostered tolerance rather
than intolerance."58
As we have mentioned, a byproduct of the case-by-case approach
to incorporation was the development of two largely separate bodies of
Religion Clause law. In what were characterized as establishment
cases leading out from Everson and McCollum, the Court employed a
bright-line separationist test; it continued to develop a balancing approach, however, in what were denominated "free exercise" cases.
Once the Court had interpreted the establishment provision so broadly
as to forbid, in principle, any governmental aid to religion, conflict
with the mandate to accommodate free exercise was inevitable. With
the extraconstitutional principle of separationism being treated as the
dominant value in these early cases, it was further almost inevitable
that free exercise would be narrowly construed to avoid conflict, for
"accommodations" of religious belief and action, when viewed
through separationist lenses, were hard to distinguish from impermissible assistance to religion.
The tension between the clauses vanished, however, where the
rights concerned were those of nonbelievers. In such cases separationism and free exercise were mutually reinforcing. Thus, in Torcaso v.
Watkins, Justice Black had no difficulty gathering unanimity for an
opinion that ruled unconstitutional the Maryland Constitution's requirement of a declaration of belief in God as a qualification for any
"office of profit or trust." 59 The state, he said, could not "pass laws or
impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers,"
and could not favor religions based on a belief in God. 60
But when accommodation/or religion was sought, the Court narrowly construed free exercise and subordinated it to the value of
nonestablishment. It was only by construing the free exercise provision as mainly protecting individual rights, largely ignoring its associational and institutional dimensions, that the Court was able to avoid
the sharpest confrontations between the understanding of establishment advanced in Everson and the basic freedom protected by the
First Amendment's Religion Clause. But in a school prayer case decided in 1962, Justice Potter Stewart called attention for the first time
to the fundamental incompatibility of the Court's two lines of religion
58. 333 U.S. at 243 n.6 (quoting McCollum v. Board of Educ., 71 N.E.2d 161, 164 (III.
1947)).
59. 367 U.S. 488, 489 (1961).
60. 367 U.S. at 495.
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cases. Engel v. Vitale 61 was the first challenge to prayer in the public
schools to be decided by the Supreme Court. The prayer at issue was
not the "Lord's Prayer," which had long been customary at the beginning of each day in the nation's schools, but rather a nondenominational prayer that the New York State Board of Regents
commissioned for use in the public schools of that large and diverse
state. The prayer read: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our
teachers and our Country. "62
When the Union Free School District No. 9 in New Hyde Park,
New York, introduced the prayer on the regents' recommendation, the
parents of several children in that district's schools brought suit,
claiming that the prayer violated the establishment provision of the
First Amendment in that it breached "the constitutional wall of separation between Church and State." 63 The case was a simple one under
the Court's establishment precedents. Justice Black, again writing for
the Court, forcefully declared that "it is no part of the business of
government to compose official prayers for any group of the American
people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by govemment."64 The school district had clearly violated the Constitution's
establishment ban since the "state prayer program officially establishe[d] the religious beliefs embodied in the Regents' prayer." 65
What makes Engel interesting, however, is not its result, which
could have been justified without resort to strict separationism, 66 but
rather the astonishment that a newcomer to the Court, Potter Stewart,
expressed at the analytical shortcomings of the majority's interpretive
approach. The establishment label, it seemed plain to him, was being
employed to cover up a major free exercise issue:
I cannot see how an "official religion" is established by letting those who
want to say a prayer say it. On the contrary, I think that to deny the
wish of these school children to join in reciting this prayer is to deny
them the opportunity of sharing in the spiritual heritage of our Nation .
. . . For we deal here not with the establishment of a state church,
which would, of course, be constitutionally impermissible, but with
whether school children who want to begin their day by joining in prayer
must be prohibited from doing so. 67
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

370 U.S. 421 (1962).
370 U.S. at 422.
370 U.S. at 425.
370 U.S. at 425.
370 U.S. at 430.
See infra notes 104 and 259 and accompanying text.
370 U.S. at 445 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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The Stewart dissent brought out into the open the problematic nature of any sharp distinction between establishment and free exercise
cases. With virtually complete state control over primary and secondary education in an epoch when children spend less and less time
with their parents and more and more time at school, the root-andbranch elimination of all traces of religion from public education unavoidably implicates the free exercise provision. At the same time, it
mandates a state of affairs that, to many religious Americans, looks
very much like establishment of a secular religion. This insight did
not, of course, dictate a decision in favor of state-sponsored school
prayer. Instead, it revealed the extreme complexity of the task of protecting religious liberty in a diverse society, a complexity the Court
had hitherto largely succeeded in disguising from itself and others.
Justice Stewart was unimpressed with the majority's ritualistic evocation of religious strife of long ago: "What is relevant to the issue
here is not the history of an established church in sixteenth century
England or in eighteenth century America, but the history of the religious traditions of our people, reflected in countless practices of the
institutions and officials of our government." 68 With numerous examples, ranging from the inaugural addresses of presidents to official slogans and mottoes, he reminded his colleagues of how deeply religious
meaning and content permeated American history and life. 69 Any attempt to understand the establishment language in a vacuum without
taking account of this living reality was bound to be wooden and
simplistic.
Stewart continued his critique of the Court's establishment doctrine along these lines in subsequent dissenting opinions, but his was a
lonely voice on what was now the Warren Court. Stewart's colleagues
were satisfied to continue to develop their Religion Clause jurisprudence under the aegis of Everson.
With hindsight, incorporation in the 1940s posed formidable legalpolitical challenges that should have called forth every ounce of energy, wit, technical skill, and legal imagination available to the Court.
Yet it is hard to escape the impression in reading the decisions of that
era that - regardless of outcomes - serious issues were overlooked,
important claims and arguments were rather lightly dismissed, and
practical implications for the lives of countless Americans were regularly ignored. The Court skipped carelessly over formidable problems
of interpretation that required sustained attention to the language, his68. 370 U.S. at 446.
69. 370 U.S. at 446-49.
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tory, and purposes of the original Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the relation among them in the modem
regulatory state. In lieu of embarking on that demanding process, Everson gave the Supreme Court's support to an approach to the religion
language of the First Amendment in which the concept of establishment was broadened, treated as separate from, and actually placed on
a collision course with the value it was meant to serve - the free
exercise of religion.
Once the Court embarked without discussion on that path, it was
almost impossible for it to avoid construing free exercise narrowly to
prevent, so far as possible, accommodations of religious belief and action that might appear, under a broad concept of establishment, to
constitute impermissible assistance to religion. The end result was an
inversion of the First Amendment's religion language. A single coherent provision that on its face seemed to protect freedom of religion by
forbidding Congress to establish religion or otherwise burden free exercise70 became two "clauses" with free exercise regularly
subordinated to a broad notion of nonestablishment. As time went on,
forbidding governmental support of religion became the cardinal value
served by the Court's decisions, and the free exercise of religion took a
back seat. Language that had been placed at the beginning of the Bill
of Rights to protect religion from government had been turned around
to protect government from religion. This subjugation of religious
freedom to separationism continued even as the Warren Court moved
more broadly to increase the scope of freedoms protected by the Bill of
Rights.

II.

THE RELIGION CLAUSE IN THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION

Beginning in the mid- to late 1950s, there emerged a consistent
voting bloc on the Supreme Court willing to develop and expand the
constitutional protection of a broad range of political and civil rights.
Over the next three decades, the Court, exercising a vigorous form of
judicial review in selected areas, announced sweeping new doctrines
that extended the scope of freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the
rights of the criminally accused, due process protection of certain statutory entitlements, privacy rights, and equal protection. At first, it
seemed that the rights revolution might yield heightened protection
for religious freedom. For, in the 1963 case Sherbert v. Verner, 71 the
Warren Court substituted a "compelling interest" test for the less rig70. I ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 555-56 (1950).
71. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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orous balancing approaches that it had been employing in free exercise
cases since the 1940s. But in School District of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 72 an establishment case decided on the same day as Sherbert,
the Court signaled that separationism would continue to drive its approach to establishment cases, taking priority over other aspects of
religious freedom. As time went on, it became apparent that the Warren Court would not merely follow the separationist principles laid
down in Everson, but would give them a new antimajoritarian thrust.
Coalitions of Justices preoccupied with protecting individuals and selected minorities from "majoritarian" legislation regularly conscripted
the Religion Clause in the service of that agenda. Separationism and
antimajoritarianism, rather than religious freedom, became central to
the Warren Court's approach in Religion Clause cases.
The marriage of these themes was effected in Sherbert and
Schempp, but not without notice and adverse comment by Justices
Stewart and Goldberg, relative newcomers to the Court to whom
many of the premises on which Religion Clause interpretation had
proceeded seemed shaky. In Sherbert, the new, higher standard of review for free exercise cases was applied to require that unemployment
benefits be provided to a Seventh Day Adventist who was discharged
for refusing to work on her Sabbath day. 73 To require accommodation
of religion in that way did not violate the Establishment Clause, Justice Brennan argued, because it did "not represent that involvement of
religious with secular institutions which it is the object of the Establishment Clause to forestall." 74 Justice Stewart, stating that "no liberty is more essential to the continued vitality of the free society which
our Constitution guarantees than is the religious liberty protected by
the Free Exercise Clause," concurred. 75 But he could not accept Justice Brennan's characterization of the purpose of the establishment
provision or the implicit subordination of free exercise. The Court's
excessively broad interpretation of establishment had led, he pointed
out, to "a double-barreled dilemma, which in all candor . . . the
Court's opinion ha[d] not succeeded in papering over." 76 Where free
exercise was concerned, the Court had at times "shown ... a distressing insensitivity to the appropriate demands of this constitutional
guarantee." 77 In the establishment area, the Court's approach had
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

374 U.S.
374 U.S.
374 U.S.
374 U.S.
374 U.S.
374 U.S.

203 (1963).
at 406-07.
at 409 (citation omitted).
at 413 (Stewart, J., concurring).
at 413.
at 414.
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"on occasion ... been not only insensitive, but positively wooden, and
... the Court ha[d] accorded to the Establishment Clause a meaning
which neither the words, the history, nor the intention of the authors
of that specific constitutional provision even remotely suggests." 78
Focusing on the problem that the Everson and McCollum courts
had studiously ignored, Justice Stewart pointed out that the strict separationist approach inaugurated in those cases had created many "situations where legitimate claims under the Free Exercise Clause will
run into head-on collision with the Court's insensitive and sterile construction of the Establishment Clause." 79 If the Court took its own
construction of the establishment language seriously ("the Establishment Clause bespeaks 'a government ... stripped of all power ... to
support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions' " 80), it would have
had to conclude in Sherbert that South Carolina was constitutionally
compelled to refuse the Seventh Day Adventist unemployment
benefits.
To Justice Stewart it seemed plain that the source of the difficulty
was a "mechanistic" concept of the establishment provision that he
labeled as historically and constitutionally wrong. 81 His concurring
opinion in Sherbert was an indictment of the slapdash manner in
which the Court had approached the problems of incorporation in the
1940s, and a reminder that the core guarantee of the Religion Clause,
religious liberty, should not be applied or withheld depending on majority or minority status.
I think the process of constitutional decision in the area of the relationships between government and religion demands considerably more than
the invocation of broadbrushed rhetoric . . . . And I think that the
guarantee of religious liberty embodied in the Free Exercise Clause affirmatively requires government to create an atmosphere of hospitality
and accommodation to individual belief and disbelief. In short, I think
our Constitution commands the positive protection by government of
religious freedom - not only for a minority, however small - not only
for the majority, however large - but for each of us. 82

Acknowledging that the flawed "decisions are on the books," Stewart
nevertheless insisted that stare decisis did not absolve the Court from
its "duty to face up to the dilemma posed by the conflict" these decisions had created. 83
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
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It is a duty . . . which we owe to the people, the States, and the
Nation, and a duty which we owe to ourselves. For so long as the resounding but fallacious fundamentalist rhetoric of some of our Establishment Clause opinions remains on our books, to be disregarded at will ...
or to be undiscriminatingly invoked . . . so long will the possibility of
consistent and perceptive decision in this most difficult and delicate area
of constitutional law be impeded and impaired. And so long, I fear, will
the guarantee of true religious freedom in our pluralistic society be uncertain and insecure. 84

The establishment decision announced on the same day as Sherbert
made it plain that Justice Stewart's call for attention to the problem of
the relation between the two parts of the religion guarantee had fallen
on deaf ears. In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 85
the Court, with only Stewart dissenting, struck down a Pennsylvania
law it construed as requiring the reading and recitation of biblical
passages and Christian prayers in the state's public school classrooms.
Perhaps the fact that much of Justice Stewart's criticism of mechanical
separationism was associated with his dissents from school prayer decisions helps to explain why his insights on the interpretive problems
were ignored. But with hindsight, the Schempp case is less remarkable
for its result, which followed from Engel v. Vitale, 86 than for its decisive affirmation of the separationist approach laid down in Everson and
its characterization of free exercise as an individual right.
In those respects, Schempp charted the basic course that the Warren and Burger Courts were to follow in the church-state area during
the period of the rights revolution. Justice Clark's majority opinion,
citing Everson for the proposition that the establishment language
commands the complete separation of church and state, 87 said the purpose of the free exercise provision was "to secure religious liberty in
the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority. "88 In the cases it chose to regard as involving establishment, the
Court endeavored to keep government apart from, and "neutral" towards, religious activity. In the free exercise cases, the Court concentrated on protecting the religious liberty of the individual. A broad
interpretation of establishment backed up by a bright-line test discouraged legislatures and administrators from accommodating or cooperating with religion in any way. An individualistic construction of free
exercise backed up by a "compelling interest" test discouraged govern84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
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ment from interfering with the religious rights of solitary individuals,
but ignored the associational aspects of free exercise.
To Justice Goldberg, who uneasily concurred in Schempp, it
seemed plain that the core of the First Amendment's religion language
was not separationism for its own sake, but freedom of religion. 89 He
agreed that the attitude of government toward religion must be one of
neutrality, but he saw that there were several ways in which that elusive concept could produce outcomes that were far from neutral. He
wrote:
[U]ntutored devotion to the concept of neutrality can lead to invocation
or approval of results which partake not simply of that noninterference
and noninvolvement with the religious which the Constitution commands, but of a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a
passive, or even active, hostility to the religious. Such results are not
only not compelled by the Constitution, but, it seems to me, are prohibited by it. 90

Justice Stewart, in dissent, continued his denunciation of the
Court's simplistic approach to the intricate interpretive problems that
had been brushed aside in the incorporation process:
It is ... a fallacious oversimplification to regard [the religion language]
as establishing a single constitutional standard of "separation of church
and state," which can be mechanically applied in every case to delineate
the required boundaries between government and religion. We err in the
first place if we do not recognize, as a matter of history and as a matter
of the imperatives of our free society, that religion and government must
necessarily interact in countless ways. Secondly, the fact is that while in
many contexts the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause
fully complement each other, there are areas in which a doctrinaire reading of the Establishment Clause leads to irreconcilable conflict with the
Free Exercise Clause.91

Echoing Justice Reed's early warning in McCollum about basing a
rule of law on a figure of speech, Justice Stewart commented, "[T]he
two relevant clauses of the First Amendment cannot accurately be reflected in a sterile metaphor which by its very nature may distort
rather than illumine the problems involved in a particular case. "92
To illustrate the conflict the Court's misreading had produced between the two clauses, Stewart offered the example of "a lonely soldier
stationed at some faraway outpost [who] could surely complain that a
government which did not provide him the opportunity for pastoral
guidance was affirmatively prohibiting the free exercise of his reli89.
90.
91.
92.
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gion. " 93 Yet, as the Court had construed establishment, the provision
of a military chaplain could be seen as unconstitutional government
support of religion. The best way to approach the problem, Stewart
suggested, was to begin with the historical context of the First Amendment. That amendment, he reminded the Court, was by its terms a
limitation on the national government. The establishment provision
was "primarily an attempt to insure that Congress not only would be
powerless to establish a national church, but would also be unable to
interfere with existing state establishments." 94 A dilemma was thus
created when the establishment provision was held to have been incorporated via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
For as Stewart noted, language that had been "designed to leave the
States free to go their own way" had now "become a restriction upon
their autonomy."95
What Justice Stewart found deplorable was that the Court had
brought a crude "mechanistic" approach to a task that required all the
resources of the judicial craft. 96 Initially, at least, the problem of the
relation between the two provisions of the Religion Clause, compounded by the difficulty of determining how the establishment language was to apply to the states, ought to have been approached in the
light of the concerns that had led to the adoption of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. The historical evidence left Justice Stewart
with little doubt that the "central value embodied in (he First Amendment - and, more particularly, in the guarantee of 'liberty' contained
in the Fourteenth - is the safeguarding of an individual's right to free
exercise of his religion. "97
Using the Schempp dispute as an example, Justice Stewart explained that recognizing religious freedom as the central value served
by both "clauses" would not make the religion cases easy to decide.
What rendered the school prayer cases particularly agonizing was precisely that conflicting free exercise claims were involved - those of
parents and children who wanted religion to be part of the school day
and those of parents and children who were offended by the practice of
public prayer or scripture reading. The argument that the former
should be content to relegate religion to after-school hours did not
wash, in Stewart's view.
For a compulsory state educational system so structures a child's life
93.
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that if religious exercises are held to be an impermissible activity in
schools, religion is placed at an artificial and state-created disadvantage.
Viewed in this light, . . . a refusal to permit religious exercises thus is
seen, not as the realization of state neutrality, but rather as the establishment of a religion of secularism, or at the least, a government support of
the beliefs of those who think that religious exercises should be conducted only in private.98

As Justice Stewart construed the statute involved in Schempp, it
did not mandate morning religious exercises in every school. Rather,
it gave permission to local school committees to decide whether or not
to conduct such exercises, and to arrange their variety and content in a
manner appropriate for local community conditions. As for those students who did not wish to participate, he emphasized that it is the
duty of government to refrain "from so structuring the school environment as to put any kind of pressure on a child to participate in those
exercises." 99 But government was not required, he believed, to insulate nonparticipants "from any awareness that some of their fellows
may want to open the school day with prayer, or of the fact that there
exist in our pluralistic society differences of religious belief." 100
In the absence of coercion upon those who do not wish to participate because they hold less strong beliefs, other beliefs, or no beliefs at all such provisions cannot ... be held to represent the type of support of
religion barred by the Establishment Clause. For the only support
which such rules provide for religion is the withholding of state hostility
- a simple acknowledgment on the part of secular authorities that the
Constitution does not require ·extirpation of all expression of religious
belief. 101

The challenge to government in a religiously diverse, liberal, democratic society, in Stewart's view, was not to dissolve or deny confessional differences by eradicating every trace of religion from the public
schools, but to find a fair way to accommodate them. The challenge
for the public schools, had Stewart's view prevailed, would have been
to try to teach tolerance, and to attempt to go beyond tolerance to
understanding and celebrating the rich diversity, as well as the common humanity, of our "incorrigibly religious," 102 heterogeneous, population. As Justice Stewart summed up his vision of religious
freedom: "What our Constitution indispensably protects is the freedom of each of us, be he Jew or Agnostic, Christian or Atheist, Bud98. 374 U.S. at 313.
99. 374 U.S. at 316.
100. 374 U.S. at 316-17.
101. 374 U.S. at 316.
102. The expression is that of Richard John Neuhaus. RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED
PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 105 (1984).
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dhist or Freethinker, to believe or disbelieve, to worship or not
worship, to pray or keep silent, according to his own conscience, uncoerced and unrestrained by government." 103 What Justice Stewart
did not sufficiently appreciate is that there were other less coercive
ways to accommodate religious expression in public settings than
through government-sponsored prayer. 104 In theory, the school
prayer cases should have drawn attention to John Stuart Mill's forgotten argument that education in a democracy is simply too important
to be left to the government. 105 But the ideology of the common
school was still too strong and the condition of public education had
not yet sufficiently deteriorated for the government's near-monopoly
on education to come into question.
Over the next several years, on a Court composed of Chief Justice
Warren and Justices Black, Fortas, Brennan, Douglas, Clark (succeeded by Marshall), White, and Harlan, Justice Stewart's opinions
played little part in the development of Religion Clause law. 106 The
individual rights/separationist/antimajoritarian approach prevailed
even through the Burger era, though it did not command a majority in
every case. Under Chief Justice Burger's leadership, a somewhat less
hard-edged version of separationism began to emerge. In a 1970 test
case challenging New York City's practice of granting property tax
exemptions to religious organizations for religious properties used
solely for worship, the Court declined to carry separationist principles
to the extreme of striking down this traditional form of accommodation. Burger, new to the Court, took the occasion of Walz v. Tax
Commission 101 to offer his own critique of the Court's precedents in
the religion area, and to try to chart a more moderate approach. "The
considerable internal inconsistency in the opinions of the Court," he
wrote, "derives from what, in retrospect, may have been too sweeping
utterances on aspects of these clauses that seemed clear in relation to
103. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 319-20.
104. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990) (upholding application of
Equal Access Act to require a public school to permit voluntary student religious group meeting
on school premises after hours on same basis as other student groups); see also infra note 259.
105. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett 1978). Mill
warned that
[a] general state education is a mere contrivance for molding people to be exactly like one
another; and as the mold in which it casts them is that which pleases the predominant power
in government, ... in proportion as it i~ efficient and successful, it establishes a despotism
over the mind, leading by natural tendency to one over the body.
Id. at 129.
106. See generally Rodney K. Smith, Justice Potter Stewart: A Contemporary Jurist's View of
Religious Liberty, 59 N.D. L. REV. 183 (1983).
107. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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the particular cases but have limited meaning as general principles." 108
He pointed out, as Justice Stewart had done in Schempp, that "[n]o
perfect or absolute separation is really possible; the very existence of
the Religion Clauses is an involvement of sorts - one that seeks to
mark boundaries to avoid excessive entanglement."109
Departing from the acontextual and ahistorical approach the
Court had taken in religion cases generally, he pointed out that tax
exemptions for religious property are the product of an "unbroken"
history that "covers our entire national existence." 110 Such exemptions, customarily accorded by the colonists, and continued by Congress and state legislatures from the Founding to the present day, had
not "le[d] to an established church or religion," but had "operated
affirmatively to help guarantee the free exercise of all forms of religious belief." 111
Stating that a more compelling case would have to be made to dislodge a practice so "deeply embedded" and widely accepted in our
culture, Chief Justice Burger declined the taxpayer's invitation to second guess the judgment of New York (and other states) in the matter.112 The legislature had determined "that certain entities that exist
in a harmonious relationship to the community at large, and that foster its 'moral or mental improvement,' should not be inhibited in their
activities by property taxation or the hazard of loss of those properties
for nonpayment of taxes." 113 Religious groups, the Chief Justice emphasized, had not been singled out by New York for this preferential
tax treatment. Instead, the state had "granted exemption to all houses
of religious worship within a broad class of property owned by nonprofit, quasi-public corporations which include hospitals, libraries,
playgrounds, scientific, professional, historical, and patriotic
groups." 114 Burger described the exemption as flowing from New
York's "affirmative policy that considers these groups as beneficial and
stabilizing influences in community life and finds this classification
useful, desirable, and in the public interest." 115 He expressly declined
to justify the tax exemption on the basis of "the social welfare services
or 'good works' that some churches perform for parishioners and
108.
109.
110.
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115.
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others - family counseling, aid to the elderly and the infirm, and to
children," for this "would introduce an element of governmental evaluation ... as to the worth of particular social welfare programs, thus
producing a kind of continuing ... relationship which the policy of
neutrality seeks to minimize." 11 6
The Chief Justice's opinion in Walz was of a piece with other Burger opinions solicitous of the ability of communities and intermediate
groups to set the conditions for their own flourishing and development, 117 and with Stewart's view of the First Amendment as establishing a positive liberty. 118 The tax exemption flowed, as Burger saw it,
from a considered legislative judgment that the state would prefer not
to burden certain groups, religions among them, because the flourishing of these groups was judged to be in the public interest. They were
deemed to be valuable in themselves, and not simply because they relieved the government of the burden of supplying certain social services. The long history of the practice of exempting certain kinds of
property from taxation, he concluded, provided ample evidence that
the exemption had not served as the toehold for an establishment of an
official religion in New York. 11 9
The Walz opinion, in retrospect, is noteworthy as one of the rare
acknowledgments by a Court majority that (1) arrangements claimed
to be violations of establishment principles may in fact be key underpinnings of free exercise, and (2) free exercise has associational and
institutional, as well as individual, dimensions. 120 These two aspects
of religious freedom had been largely ignored in the Court's earlier
free exercise opinions, while the broad establishment characterization
effectively obscured the free exercise implications of those cases. What
had lapsed, in the long period between the Founding and incorpora116. 397 U.S. at 674.
117. E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973) ("People in different States vary in
their tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed
uniformity."); Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-58 (1973) (legitimate state interests in controlling commercial obscenity "include the interest of the public in the quality of life
and the total community environment"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972) (protecting the traditional "way of life and mode of education" of Old Order Amish).
118. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 415-16 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring).
119. 397 U.S. at 678.
120. Any distinction between individual and associational freedom in the religion area is
difficult to maintain. Michael Sandel has persuasively argued that the Court's long practice of
treating religion as the product of individual choice, and of regarding religious freedom as in the
service of individual autonomy, leaves out of consideration the beliefs and practices of the vast
numbers of religious Americans to whom the existence of a worshipping community is essential
to religious experience. Michael J. Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, in
ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE: THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAUSES AND THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 74, 87 (James D. Hunter & Os Guinness eds., 1990) [hereinafter ARTICLES OF FAITH].
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tion, was the understanding that the Bill of Rights protects certain
social structures as well as individuals - churches in the First
Amendment, community militia in the Second, and juries in the Sixth
and Seventh. 121 Walz thus opened the door, not only to a milder version of separationism, but to a broader, more authentic, concept of free
exercise.
Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, attempted to limit the damage
to separationist principles. There were only "two basic secular purposes for granting real property tax exemptions to religious organizations," he wrote. 122 The first was the social welfare purpose that Chief
Justice Burger's majority opinion explicitly rejected. The second was
the promotion of pluralism.
Government may properly include religious institutions among the variety of private, nonprofit groups that receive tax exemptions, for each
group contributes to the diversity of association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic society.... To this end, New
York extends its exemptions not only to religious and social service
organizations but also to scientific, literary, bar, library, patriotic, and
historical groups, and generally to institutions "organized exclusively for
the moral or mental improvement of men and women."123
... It is true that each church contributes to the pluralism of our
society through its purely religious activities, but the state encourages
these activities not because it champions religion per se but because it
values religion among a variety of private, nonprofit enterprises that contribute to the diversity of the Nation.124
Straining to keep the Walz holding within the narrowest possible confines, Justice Brennan concluded that the exemption was valid only
because it did not single out religion for special treatment, and because
it served the secular purposes of providing social services and fostering
diversity.
A year after the Walz decision, Chief Justice Burger attempted to
extricate the Court from the sorts of difficulties and inconsistencies
that in his view had marred establishment jurisprudence. Writing for
the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, he expanded on the critique he had
begun in Walz of the absolutist conception of separation. 125 The "line
of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relation121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See infra notes 316-20 and accompanying text.
397 U.S. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
397 U.S. at 689 (quoting N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX§ 420, subd. 1).
397 U.S. at 693.
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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ship." 126 To replace the "wall" metaphor with what he believed to be
a more workable approach, he drew on prior cases, including his own
opinion in Walz, to devise a three-part test for determining when a
particular governmental action would pass muster under the establishment language. The test requires a challenged governmental action to
cross each of three hurdles: (1) it must have a secular purpose, (2) its
principal or primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion,
and (3) it must not foster excessive government entanglement with
religion. 127
In the Lemon case itself, the entanglement prong proved fatal for
the two statutory schemes before the Court: one reimbursing nonpublic elementary and secondary schools for the cost of teachers' salaries,
textbooks, and instructional materials in specified secular subjects; the
other directly providing teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic elementary schools with a supplement of fifteen percent of their annual
salary. Both programs, according to Chief Justice Burger, impermissibly entangled the government with religion. For to be certain that
public funds were in fact being used for secular purposes, there would
have to be a degree of "surveillance" that would run afoul of the new
test.12s
The Lemon test did represent a more realistic version of the separationist approach, but it did not deviate from the main lines laid
down in Everson and McCollum. As Justice White pointed out in his
partial dissent, the Court continued to ignore the fact that the establishment provision "coexists in the First Amendment with the Free
Exercise Clause and the latter is surely relevant in [school] cases such
as these." 129 Moreover, Burger's concern about the disorderly state of
Religion Clause law did not incline him to reexamine its foundations
or to question its implicit assumptions.
It soon became apparent that the Lemon test would not succeed in
introducing consistency into the Court's pattern of decisions, for it
proved extraordinarily malleable and was invoked in support of highly
divergent results. By 1973, the Chief Justice found himself dissenting
from a majority opinion by Justice Powell, applying the Lemon test to
strike down New York's program of tuition grants and tax credits to
parents whose children attended religious schools. 130 A Court majority's expansive understanding of what it means to advance religion, or
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

403 U.S. at 614.
403 U.S. at 612-13.
403 U.S. at 619, 621.
403 U.S. at 665.
Committee on Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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what constitutes excessive entanglement between church and state,
continued, for the next decade, to signal that a formidable gauntlet
awaited legislative and local experiments with creative use of nongovernmental agencies to deliver educational and other social services.
Despite his unwillingness to break with separationism as the driving force in establishment cases, Chief Justice Burger did garner a majority for an opinion manifesting an unprecedented judicial sensitivity
to the associational dimension of religious liberty in a free exercise
case, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 131 decided the year after the Lemon test was
announced. The case arose when certain members of Old Order
Amish religious communities were convicted of violating a Wisconsin
law that required parents to send their children to school until the age
of sixteen. A stark conflict was presented between the state's undisputedly strong interest in providing for the education and development of all its citizens and the Amish parents' claim that "their
children's attendance at high school, public or private [beyond the age
of fourteen], was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life" and
would endanger their and their children's salvation.13z
What is especially noteworthy about Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court in support of the position of the Amish parents is
that it adopted a broader view of free exercise and manifested a greater
degree of interest in the record than had been characteristic in religion
cases up to that time. The Chief Justice described at length the nature
of the interest of the Amish groups in receiving an exemption from the
state requirement. The Amish rejected high school for their children
because it exposed them to " 'worldly' influence in conflict with their
beliefs." 133 In high school, the Amish believed, their children would
be taught to value intellectual and scientific accomplishment, self-distinction, competitiveness, and worldly success. They preferred that
their children be socialized into a community based on "informal
learning-through-doing; a life of 'goodness,' rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than technical knowledge; community welfare,
rather than competition; and separation from, rather than integration
with, contemporary worldly society."134
Socialization of the Amish children in the high schools instead of
home education took them
away from their community, physically and emotionally, during the crucial and formative adolescent period of life. During this period, the chil131.
132.
133.
134.

406
406
406
406

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

205 (1972).
at 209.
at 211.
at 211.
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dren must acquire Amish attitudes favoring manual work and selfreliance and the specific skills needed to perform the adult role of an
Amish farmer or housewife.... [T]he Amish child must also grow in his
faith and his relationship to the Amish community if he is to be prepared
to accept the heavy obligations imposed by adult baptism. In short, high
school attendance with teachers who are not of the Amish faith . . .
interposes a serious barrier to the integration of the Amish child into the
Amish religious community. 135

Meticulous record-building work at the trial level by lawyers for
the Amish appears to have helped convince the Chief Justice that
nothing less than the perpetuation of the Amish way of life was at
stake. He noted that an expert on the Amish had testified that high
school would not only inflict "great psychological harm to Amish children, because of the conflicts it would produce, but would also . . .
ultimately result in the destruction of the Old Order Amish church
community as it exists in the United States today." 136 The Amish free
exercise claim, according to the Chief Justice, was an attempt to find
shelter from modem society's "hydraulic insistence on conformity to
majoritarian standards." 137 The Wisconsin law presented "a very real
threat of undermining the Amish community and religious practice as
they exist today; they must either abandon belief and be assimilated
into society at large, or be forced to migrate to some other and more
tolerant region." 138
Having characterized the interest of the Amish in gaining an ex-emption from the state's compulsory education laws as a strong one,
the Chief Justice turned to the state's interest in refusing to grant them
an exemption. Citing Sherbert v. Verner, he wrote that "only those
interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." 139 The
state's compulsory education policy was an important one, he began,
motivated by the public interest in producing self-reliant and productive citizens. But as applied to the Amish, he found it inapposite.
Whatever their idiosyncracies as seen by the majority, this record
strongly shows that the Amish community has been a highly successful
social unit within our society, even if apart from the conventional "mainstream." Its members are productive and very law-abiding members of
society; they reject public welfare in any of its usual modern forms. 140

Since Wisconsin had presented the Court with no "strong" evidence to
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
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215 (citing, inter alia, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
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the contrary, Chief Justice Burger declined to accept the state's contention that uneducated Amish children would become "burdens on
society should they determine to leave the Amish faith." 141 He went
on to observe that the "independence and successful social functioning
of the Amish community for a period approaching almost three centuries and more than 200 years in this country" rendered the state's assertion that one or two more years of schooling were necessary "at
best ... speculative." 142 Burger concluded by emphasizing that the
case involved the "fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted with
that of the State, to guide the religious future and education of their
children." 143
What makes the Yoder opinion a landmark in free exercise law is
not its bare result, but the careful attention accorded by Chief Justice
Burger to the facts, and what one might call his holistic or "ecological" understanding of what was at stake in the case. Much more was
at issue, he saw, than the immediate disagreement over how individual
school children would spend their day. The retention of the ability of
the Amish community to set conditions for its own long-term perpetuation was the real heart of the respondents' claim. The Court's willingness to accord constitutional standing to that aspect of free exercise
represented a significant, if fleeting, recognition that religious experience is not always a matter solely involving "the individual man and
his God." 144 Yoder's implicit acknowledgment that the religious experience often cannot be separated from the fate of a community - that
it may bind the present with the past and the future and play an important role in shaping the character of its members - was an opening to a more capacious approach to free exercise. It stands in marked
contrast with the cramped vision of free exercise that had played
havoc with the Court's understanding of both the establishment and
free exercise provisions of the First Amendment since the 1940s.
As in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 145 the free exercise rights in Yoder
received a significant boost from their close association with other important interests with constitutional status, in this case family and associational rights. The fact that the associational dimension of free
exercise involved in Yoder was that of a "quaint" minority religion
probably helped the Chief Justice to persuade all but one of his colleagues on that occasion. The Chief Justice himself stressed the nar141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

406 U.S. at 225.
406 U.S. at 226-27.
406 U.S. at 232.
See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I, 57-58 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
310 U.S. 296 (1940). See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
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rowness of the holding in this respect, emphasizing that the Amish are
not a group with a "recently discovered" process for educating children, and that "few other religious groups or sects could make" such a
"convincing showing" as to outweigh the powerful state interest involved in compulsory education. 146 Only Justice Douglas dissented,
and then only in part, as to those Amish children who had not expressed a preference in the matter. t47
The narrowness of Yoder was reemphasized eleven years later in
Bob Jones University v. United States, 148 where the Court in a unanimous opinion 149 (written by Chief Justice Burger) rejected the free exercise claim of a private university stripped of its tax exempt status by
the federal government because of its religiously motivated policies
against interracial dating. In no uncertain terms, the Chief Justice
made it clear that the religion claims would have to bow to the strong
governmental interest relating to one of the nation's most serious social problems. "Whatever may be the rationale for such private
schools' policies, and however sincere the rationale may be, racial discrimination in education is contrary to public policy." 150 The governmental interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education
prevailed, he said, over any free exercise interests the school might be
able to demonstrate.1st
Given the expansive approach to personal liberties the Warren and
Burger courts adopted, one might have expected free exercise, at least
in the narrower, individual sense, to have flourished under the Sherbert compelling interest test and to have benefited from the increased
protection accorded to individual rights generally by the Court in the
1960s and 1970s. But that was not the case. For, even during the
rights revolution, except in Yoder and in the unemployment compensation cases, free exercise values were regularly subordinated by the
courts to governmental interests. 152
146. 406 U.S. at 235, 236.
147. Stating that "[r]eligion is an individual experience," Douglas wrote that students have
the right "to be masters of their own destiny" and that the Court should not assist parents in
barring their children "forever ... from entry into the new and amazing world of diversity that
we have today." 406 U.S. at 243, 245.
148. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
149. Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion but joined the part of the Court's opinion
dealing with the free exercise claim. 461 U.S. at 606 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist
dissented on other grounds, but agreed that a denial of tax exempt status "would not infringe on
petitioners' First Amendment rights." 461 U.S. at 622 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
150. 461 U.S. at 595.
151. 461 U.S. at 603-04.
152. See generally Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. Cr. REV. l;
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV.
1109 (1990). Sherbert's very existence, however, may have served to shelter free exercise by
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Nowhere have the deleterious effects of the Court's excessively narrow view of free exercise and obsessively separationist interpretation of
establishment been more apparent than in the cases involving schools.
In a judicial pincer movement, one line of decisions leading out from
McCollum 153 through Engel v. Vitale 154 requires the public schools to
be rigorously secular, while another has struck down most forms of
assistance to parents who fear for their children's welfare in educational systems that are often actively promoting values profoundly at
odds with the family's religious convictions. 155 Despite the Court's
willingness to give establishment an expansive interpretation, it has
never acknowledged or come to terms with Justice Stewart's point that
rigorous separationism is itself a kind of establishment because of the
degree to which a compulsory state education system structures a
child's life. 156 The net result has been that a crucial aspect of religious
freedom remains unavailable to those families that are not wealthy
enough to afford private education after paying their local taxes to
support public schools. Nor is private education an entirely safe harbor from excessively intrusive and homogenizing regulation.
In a school case decided in 1985, Justice Brennan took the separationist Lemon test to such extremes that he may have hastened its
eventual downfall. In Aguilar v. Felton, 151 the Court struck down a
Great Society program that had been designed to provide federal aid
to local agencies to assist educationally deprived children from lowincome families. The New York City program involved in Aguilar
had for nineteen years furnished public school teachers who provided
remedial services and instruction to special needs children from the
city's poorest neighborhoods. In the 1980s, six taxpayers attacked this
longstanding and successful program as a violation of the establishment provision because it made these services available in private religious schools as well as in public schools. In the school year 19811982, 13.2% of the students eligible to be aided by the program were
enrolled in private schools. Of that group, 84% were in Roman Catholic schools and 8% in Hebrew schools.
signaling to legislators and other government officials that religious exemptions from certain laws
would be required. As to this deterrent effect, see text accompanying note 266 infra.
153. Illinois ex rel. Mccollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1943); see supra text accompanying notes 47-58.
154. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
155. The cases are collected in Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
110-12 (1985).
156. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 313 (1963) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
157. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
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Under the program in these religious schools, regular employees of
the public schools who had volunteered to teach in the nonpublic
schools provided instruction in remedial reading, remedial mathematics, and English as a second language. The city's Bureau of Nonpublic
School Reimbursement made the teacher assignments, and the instructors were supervised by field personnel who tried to pay at least one
unannounced visit per month. The supervisors of the field personnel
also paid occasional unannounced visits to the classes. The city employees working in the religious schools were under instructions to
avoid involvement with religious activities at the schools, to bar religious materials from their classrooms, to select the students themselves, to minimize contact with private school personnel, and to
ensure that the parochial school administrators removed all religious
symbols from the classrooms used by the public school personnel. 158
On those facts, the Court, by a five-to-four majority, found that the
program impermissibly entangled the state with religion. Justice
Brennan's opinion for the Court gave several reasons for finding the
program constitutionally infirm within the Lemon framework. "When
the state becomes enmeshed with a given denomination in matters of
religious significance," he warned, "the freedom of religious belief of
those who are not adherents of that denomination suffers, even when
the governmental purpose underlying the involvement is largely secular." 159 In addition, the religious freedom of adherents of the denomination is jeopardized by the governmental intrusion into sacred
matters.
After discussing the Court's previous religion and public education
decisions, Justice Brennan concluded that because of the "pervasively
sectarian environment" of the schools and because teachers provided
the assistance, the New York program would require permanent and
extensive state supervision. "We have long recognized that underlying
the Establishment Clause is 'the objective . . . to prevent, as far as
possible, the intrusion of either [church or state] into the precincts of
the other.' " 160 In this case, he wrote, intrusion by the state was
unavoidable:
[T]he detailed monitoring and close administrative contact required to
158. 473 U.S. at 404-07. The Court's appreciation of the issues in Aguilar may have been
colored by the fact that Aguilar's companion case, School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373 (1985), raised more serious establishment questions. One of the programs at issue in Grand
Rapids, unlike in Aguilar, involved the use of public funds to pay full-time employees of religious
schools to teach secular subjects under the supervision of religious school administrators. Grand
Rapids, 473 U.S. at 376-77.
159. 473 U.S. at 409-10.
160. 473 U.S. at 413 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)).
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maintain New York City's Title I program can only produce "a kind of
continuing day-to-day relationship which the policy of neutrality seeks
to mi11lmize." [quoting Walz v. Tax Commission] The numerous judgments that must be made by agents of the city concern matters that may
be subtle and controversial, yet may be of deep religious significance to
the controlling denominations. As government agents must make these
judgments, the dangers of political divisiveness along religious lines increase. At the same time "[t]he picture of state inspectors prowling the
halls of parochial schools and auditing classroom instruction surely
raises more than an imagined specter of governmental 'secularization of
a creed.' " 161

Brennan concluded that the remedial program violated the Lemon requirements that "neither the State nor Federal Government shall promote or hinder a particular faith or faith generally through the
advancement of benefits or through the excessive entanglement of
church and state in the administration of those benefits." 162
The conclusory nature and perfunctory reasoning of Brennan's
majority opinion drew a series of sharp dissents, revealing that several
members of the Court were no longer willing to take separationism to
the limit. Chief Justice Burger, then in his last year on the Court,
seemed appalled at the use to which the test he had devised in Lemon
had been put. Focusing on the "human cost" of the Court's decision,
he caustically expressed his doubt that "programs designed to prevent
a generation of children from growing up without being able to read
effectively" were steps toward an established church:
The notion that denying these services to students in religious schools is
a neutral act to protect us from an Established Church has no support in
logic, experience, or history. Rather than showing ... neutrality ... it
exhibits nothing less than hostility toward religion and the children who
attend church-sponsored schools. 163

Justice White, a longtime dissenter from the Court's interpretation
of the establishment provision in school cases, took the occasion to
reiterate his view that those decisions were "not required by the First
Amendment and were contrary to the long-range interests of the
country." 164
Justice Rehnquist's dissent took the Court to task for striking
down the program on the basis of a
"Catch-22" paradox of its own creation ... whereby aid must be supervised to ensure no entanglement but the supervision itself is held to cause
161. 473 U.S. at 414 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 650 (opinion of Brennan, J.)).
162. 473 U.S. at 414.
163. 473 U.S. at 419-20 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
164. School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 400 (1984) (White, J., dissenting
from the decisions in both Aguilar and Grand Rapids).
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an entanglement.... [W]e have indeed traveled far afield from the concerns which prompted the adoption of the First Amendment when we
rely on gossamer abstractions to invalidate a law which obviously meets
an entirely secular need.165
It was Justice O'Connor's dissent, however, that delivered the
most telling criticisms of the indifference to practical consequences
that characterized the majority's opinion. Indeed, her opinion in
Aguilar stands as the definitive rebuke to the Court's general approach
to establishment issues from 1947 onward. She chided the majority
for its lack of attention to the actual operation of the program it struck
down, for the abstract character of its reasoning, and for its apparent
unconcern with the effects of the decision on the lives and prospects of
20,000 special needs children from the poorest families in New York
City, as well as children in similar programs in other parts of the
country.
This holding rests on the theory ... that public school teachers who set
foot on parochial school premises are likely to bring religion into their
classes, and that the supervision necessary to prevent religious teaching
would unduly entangle church and state. Even if this theory were valid
in the abstract, it cannot validly be applied to New York City's 19-yearold Title I program. The Court greatly exaggerates the degree of supervision necessary to prevent public school teachers from inculcating religion, and thereby demonstrates the flaws of a test that condemns benign
cooperation between church and state. 166
Justice O'Connor thought it useful to describe the Title I program
more fully than the majority had. She began by noting that the program represented Congress' recognition that "poor academic performance by disadvantaged children is part of the cycle of poverty," and its
consequent decision to make a special effort to reach children who
would not receive the educational services they needed without governmental assistance. 167 The sole reason disclosed by the record for
offering classes funded under Title I on the premises of parochial
schools, she noted, was that "alternative means to reach the disadvantaged parochial school students - such as instruction ... at the nearest public school ... were unsuccessful." 168 The record afforded little
basis, she pointed out, for the fears of the majority that " 'state-paid
instructors, influenced by the pervasively sectarian nature of the religious schools in which they work, may subtly or overtly indoctrinate
the students in particular religious tenets at public expense' "; that
165.
166.
167.
168.

Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 420-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
473 U.S. at 421 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
473 U.S. at 422.
473 U.S. at 423.
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state-provided education in religious school buildings threatens to convey a message of state support for religion to students and the general
public; and that the program subsidizes the religious function of the
parochial schools by taking over a substantial portion of their secular
education. 169 In fact, the record disclosed not a single instance of religious "inculcation" or advancement by the public teachers during the
nineteen years the program had been in operation. In sum, she concluded that the majority's "abstract theories" about how the program
in question "might possibly advance religion dissolve in the face of
experience in New York City."170
The absence of evidence to support the majority's fear of religious
advancement was hardly surprising in O'Connor's commonsensical
view:
New York City's public Title I instructors are professional educators
who can and do follow instructions not to inculcate religion in their
classes. They are unlikely to be influenced by the sectarian nature of the
parochial schools where they teach, not only because they are carefully
supervised by public officials, but also because the vast majority of them
visit several different schools each week and are not of the same religion
as their parochial students. 171

With some asperity, she remarked that it is "not intuitively obvious
that a dedicated public school teacher will tend to disobey instructions
and commence proselytizing students at public expense merely because the classroom is within a parochial school." 172
What was abundantly clear, and what the majority had slighted,
according to O'Connor, was that the Title I program had provided
significant benefits to the public and the students. The record showed
that "impoverished school children are being helped to overcome
learning deficits, improving their test scores, and receiving a significant
boost in their struggle to obtain both a thorough education and the
opportunities that flow from it." 173 As for the majority's contention
that the supervision necessary to prevent the inculcation of religion
creates excessive entanglement, she pointed out that the degree of supervision required "does not differ significantly from the supervision
any public school teacher receives, regardless of the location of the
classroom." If extensive supervision were really necessary to prevent
the public school teachers from inculcating religion, she pointed out,
that "would require us to close our public schools, for there is always
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

473
473
473
473
473

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
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some chance that a public school teacher will bring religion into the
classroom, regardless of its location." 174- She also dismissed the majority's ritual invocation of political divisiveness, pointing again to the
actual facts of the case: "There is little record support for the proposition that New York City's admirable Title I program has ignited any
controversy other than this litigation."115
The proper way to approach the matter, Justice O'Connor argued,
was through the substitute for the Lemon test that she had proposed
the previous year. 176 "If a statute lacks a purpose or effect of advancing or endorsing religion, I would not invalidate it merely because it
requires some ongoing cooperation between church and state or some
state supervision to ensure that state funds do not advance
religion." 177
The Justice closed her opinion with a consideration of the practical
effects of the majority's holding. She noted that public school students
would be unaffected, and that some parochial school students might be
spared the loss of instruction under Title I through "programs offered
off the premises of their schools - possibly in portable classrooms just
over the edge of the school property." 178 The unlucky children who
would "lose" are "those in cities where it is not economically and logistically feasible to provide public facilities for remedial education adjacent to the parochial school. But this subset is significant, for it
includes more than 20,000 New York City schoolchildren and uncounted others elsewhere in the country." 179 For that large group of
needy children, she said, the decision in Aguilar was "tragic." 180
The Court deprives them of a program that offers a meaningful chance at
success in life, and it does so on the untenable theory that public school
teachers (most of whom are of different faiths than their students) are
likely to start teaching religion merely because they have walked across
the threshold of a parochial school.... I cannot close my eyes to the fact
that, over almost two decades, New York City's public school teachers
have helped thousands of impoverished parochial school children to
overcome educational disadvantages without once attempting to inculcate religion. Their praiseworthy efforts have not eroded and do not
174. 473 U.S. at 428-29. For illustrations of Justice O'Connor's point, see Bishop v. Aronov,
926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991) (state university professor interjected religious beliefs during
instructional time); Roberts v. Madigan, 702 F. Supp. 1505 (D. Colo. 1989), ajfd., 921F.2d1047
(10th Cir. 1990) (elementary school teacher silently read Bible during classroom hours in view of
students).
175. 473 U.S. at 429.
176. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
177. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 430 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
178. 473 U.S. at 430-31.
179. 473 U.S. at 431.
180. 473 U.S. at 431.
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threaten the religious liberty assured by the Establishment Clause.1 81
Like the McCollum case that had squelched efforts at interfaith
cooperation in Illinois nearly four decades earlier, 182 Aguilar deployed
abstract separationist logic and baseless evocations of sectarian strife
to strike down a benign legislative program worked out by Congress
after extensive cooperative effort with and testimony from a wide variety of religious organizations. Moreover, the decision seemed to place
religion, alone among human activities, in a suspect category. Normally, a litigant challenging a governmental action would have the
burden of showing that the activity in question violated the Constitution. But Aguilar inverted the usual presumption, by striking down
the remedial program because the government could not prove there
would never be unconstitutional advancement of religion by public
school teachers. 183 By making the eradication of government support
for religion the chief aim of establishment provision interpretation, the
Court had gone to extremes in striking down forms of governmental
accommodation of religious belief and exercise of the sort that are in
place in every other tolerant, liberal, democracy.184
At first glance, it seems difficult to reconcile Justice Brennan's exaggerated suspicion regarding religion in the Aguilar case with his vigorous advocacy of aggressive free exercise protection stretching back
to his Sherbert opinion in 1963. 185 But his uncompromising separationism in establishment cases and his commitment to protecting certain types of free exercise are both consistent with his view of the
Supreme Court's role as a bulwark against majoritarian tyranny and as
the champion of selected individual and minority rights. The place of
the First Amendment's religion guarantee in Justice Brennan's judicial
philosophy is illuminated by comparing his Aguilar opinion with a dissent he filed three years later in a free exercise case, where he attacked
the Court's majority for insensitivity to the associational religious
rights of members of a minority religion.
In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 186 the
Court held that the free exercise provision did not prohibit the federal
government from allowing timber harvesting in, or the construction of
a road through, a portion of government-owned property, even though
181. 473 U.S. at 431.
182. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1943); see supra text accom·
panying notes 47-48.
183. Mark E. Chopko, Has U.S. Society Become Anti-Religious?, CATHOLIC LEAGUE NEWS·
LEITER, Nov. 1991, at 5, 11.
184. See CHARLES L. GLENN, CHOICE OF SCHOOLS IN SIX NATIONS (1989).
185. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see supra text accompanying notes 71-84.
186. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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the land in question had traditionally been used for religious purposes
by members of three American Indian tribes, and the proposed activity would have a serious impact on their religious life. 187 Justice Brennan's dissent stressed the effect the proposed activity would have on a
fragile religious community:
As the Forest Service's commissioned study ... explains, for Native
Americans religion is not a discrete sphere of activity separate from all
others, and any attempt to isolate the religious aspects of Indian life "is
in reality an exercise which forces Indian concepts into non-Indian categories."188 ... Thus, for most Native Americans, "[t]he area of worship
cannot be delineated from social, political, cultu[ral], and other areas o[t]
Indian lifestyle." ... A pervasive feature of this lifestyle is the individual's relationship with the natural world; this relationship, which can
accurately though somewhat incompletely be characterized as one of
stewardship, forms the core of what might be called, for want of a better
nomenclature, the Indian religious experience. 189
Justice Brennan demonstrated in Lyng that he was well able to
understand that more than just the individual free exercise of the relatively few Indians who used the sacred site was at stake. "Although
few Tribe members actually make medicine at the most powerful sites,
the entire Tribe's welfare hinges on the success of the individual practitioners." 190 He also showed himself able, on this occasion, to take an
ecological view of free exercise, as Chief Justice Burger had done in
Yoder. 191 Justice Brennan noted that "we have recognized that laws
that affect spiritual development by impeding the integration of children into the religious community or by increasing the expense of adherence to religious principles - in short, laws that frustrate or inhibit
religious practice - trigger the protections of the constitutional guarantee." 192 What was at stake in Lyng, he saw, was not merely the free
187. 485 U.S. at 451-53.
188. 485 U.S. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting D. TuEODORATUS, CULTURAL RESOURCES OF THE CHIMNEY ROCK SECTION, GASQUET-ORLEANS ROAD, SIX RIVERS NATIONAL
FOREST (1979)).
189. 485 U.S. at 460 (quoting American Indian Religious Freedom, Hearings on S. J. Res. 102
Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1978) (statement of
Barney Old Coyote, Crow Tribe) [hereinafter Hearings]).
190. 485 U.S. at 462.
191. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see supra text accompanying notes 131-44.
192. 485 U.S. at 469 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Justice Brennan's concurring opinion
in Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), in which he described the
connection between individual free exercise and protecting the autonomy of religious
communities:
For many individuals, religious activity derives meaning in large measure from participation
in a larger religious community. Such a community represents an ongoing tradition of
shared beliefs, an organic entity not reducible to a mere aggregation of individuals. . . .
Solicitude for a church's ability to [define itself] reflects the idea that furtherance of the
autonomy of religious organizations often furthers individual religious freedom as well.
483 U.S. at 342 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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exercise of the individuals who actually used the disputed sites, but the
entire communities to which they were spiritually connected.
Justice Brennan's eloquent and persuasive description of the way
in which Native American religion is inextricably woven into the rest
of life implied that such integration is alien to the Western tradition.
To "attempt to isolate the religious aspects of Indian life,'' he claimed,
"is in reality an exercise which forces Indian concepts into non-Indian
categories." 19 3 But those "non-Indian categories" that rigidly separate the secular and the religious are not part of some generic "Western" inheritance, as Brennan seemed to assume. They are the product
of a particular philosophy that has found its fullest expression only in
the laws of countries attached to pre-1989 communism, and in certain
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court to which he himself had been a
major contributor.
The categories Brennan found so inappropriate to Native American religion in Lyng would strike many other Americans as equally
inapplicable to their religious experience. For a fundamental error of
many of the religion cases Justice Brennan participated in was precisely their failure to recognize that, for vast numbers of American
women and men, religion is as inseparable from the rest of social life as
it is for the Native Americans involved in Lyng. For many, perhaps
most, Americans, "[t]he area of worship cannot be delineated,'' as
Brennan stated in Lyng, "from social, political, cultu[ral], and other
areas" of life.1 94
How, then, is one to explain the difference between the Brennan of
the establishment cases and the Brennan of the free exercise cases?
Why did he treat religion as a private individual experience in the former, while he was, on occasion, ready to see it as inseparable from the
rest of life and associational in the latter? One might try to reconcile
the positions by arguing that in both sets of opinions he was merely
attempting to enforce government neutrality, in the establishment
cases blocking government favoritism and in the free exercise cases
government hostility. This explanation founders, however, on the artificiality of the distinction between the two classes of cases. Which, for
example, evinces more government favoritism for a religion - a government program that permits a public school teacher to teach remedial reading to poor students, including those who happen to attend
religious schools (Aguilar}, or a government decision to divert one of
193. 485 U.S. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting D. THEODORATUS, supra note 188).
194. 485 U.S. at 459-60 (quoting Hearings, supra note 189).
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its roads, built on public land, in order to protect the area for worship
by a particular religious group (Lyng)?
The apparent contradiction disappears, however, if we hypothesize
that Brennan's approach to the religion provisions was driven by a
vision of constitutionalism in which the Bill of Rights was primarily a
charter for judges to defend individuals and small or unpopular minority groups against majoritarian infringement. In this light, Brennan's
Religion Clause jurisprudence is all of a piece. In the establishment
cases, he used separationism as a device to block what he perceived as
attempts by large religious groups to expand their role in public life.
In free exercise cases, he was comfortable with governmental accommodation to protect individuals and small or unpopular religious minorities. In the former, he characterized religion as individual and
private; in the latter, he could envision it as associational and inseparable from other aspects of life. He shifted easily from one mode of
Religion Clause interpretation to the other as the occasion demanded.
Justice Brennan's vision of the Religion Clauses as checks on state
power designed primarily to protect those individuals who are not
members of the numerically dominant faiths prevailed on the Court
through the period of the rights revolution. Looking back over the
development of Religion Clause jurisprudence from the first incorporation cases up to Aguilar, one can see that this body of law is not
quite so incomprehensible as it is often said to be. To be sure, it is not
notably characterized by the reasoned elaboration of principles
grounded in constitutional text or tradition. Nor does it display much
evidence of a sustained collegial effort to discern the underlying purposes and values of the religion provisions of the First Amendment,
and to effectuate them in a reasonably consistent way. Nevertheless,
and despite some anomalies, the fact patterns and outcomes in these
cases do reflect with a fair degree of consistency a strict separationist
vision with an antimajoritarian gloss. That approach produced credible analyses of individual and minority free exercise cases, but regularly sacrificed freedom of religion to the value of separation in
establishment cases. As Justice Kennedy was to observe as the Court
moved into a new phase, this approach created "classes of religions
based on the relative numbers of their adherents," and consigned "religions enjoying the largest following . . . to the status of least favored
faiths. " 195
By the mid-1980s, however, the hold of strict separationism was
195. Allegheny v. A.C.L.U., 492 U.S. 573, 677 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (1989).
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less secure on a changing Court. 196 In retrospect, 1985 was a watershed year in Religion Clause interpretation, for dissents filed in two
cases decided that year provided strong pragmatic and theoretical justifications for reconsidering at least the establishment precedents. Justice O'Connor's Aguilar dissent laid bare the destructiveness of the
mechanical separationist approach in practical and human terms. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Wallace v. Jaffree, made it plain that
strict separationism had no basis in constitutional text, history or tradition.197 In both cases, Justice Powell had provided a crucial fifth
vote for the separationist view. 198 In 1986, Rehnquist became Chief
Justice upon Burger's retirement, and Antonin Scalia joined the
Court. When Anthony Kennedy took Powell's seat the following
year, the Court seemed poised to take a fresh look at the religion language of the First Amendment.

III.

THE EMERGING DEFERENCE DOCTRINE

In the Religion Clause decisions of the Rehnquist Court, a new
approach has begun to emerge, but its contours are not yet fully clear.
The salient characteristic of the emerging approach is the disposition
on the part of an otherwise fragmented majority to exercise great restraint in setting aside the decisions of other branches of government
in the church-state area. Thus the Court has produced decisions upholding legislation that previously might have been seen as violating
the Establishment Clause, 199 but it has also refused to invalidate regulations or laws that burden individual, 200 associational,201 and institutional202 free exercise. This trend has prompted some observers to
conclude that the Court is effectively removing the religious freedom
guarantee from the Bill of Rights by relegating most of the problems
196. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (Establishment Clause not violated by Minnesota
statute permitting parents of parochial school students to deduct tuition, textbook, and transportation expenses); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (Establishment Clause not violated by
Nebraska legislature's chaplaincy practice); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (Establish·
ment Clause not violated by inclusion of creche in Pawtucket, Rhode Island's Christmas
display).
197. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
198. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), was a five-to-four decision. Wallace was a sixto-three decision with O'Connor concurring only in the judgment.
199. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589
(1988).
200. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1575 (1990); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482
U.S. 342 (1987); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693
(1986).
201. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
202. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board
of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
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in the area to the political process. 203
In retrospect, the transition to the new stance seems to have begun
in the final years of the Burger Court in a free exercise case that by
itself did not clearly prefigure a move to an across-the-board posture of
deference. Goldman v. Weinberger involved a citizen caught in a conflict between his religious obligation, as an orthodox Jewish rabbi, to
wear a yarmulke, and the dress regulations of the U.S. Air Force,
which required him to keep his head uncovered while on duty indoors.204 Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court, rejecting Captain
Goldman's claim for an exemption from the military dress code on
free exercise grounds, did not treat the case as presenting a conflict
between an individual and government in the abstract, but rather as
involving Captain Goldman's obligations to a unique form of community. Quoting from an earlier opinion to the effect that" 'the military
is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society,' " 205 Rehnquist described the requirements of the military community at some length.
The military need not encourage debate or tolerate protest to the extent that such tolerance is required of the civilian state by the First
Amendment; to accomplish its mission the military must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps.... The essence
of military service "is the subordination of the desires and interests of the
individual to the needs of the service."206 . . . "[W]ithin the military
community there is simply not the same [individual] autonomy as there
is in the larger civilian community."201

Declining to apply the compelling interest standard of Sherbert to
the special situation of the military, Rehnquist said, "[W]hen evaluating whether military needs justify a particular restriction on religiously motivated conduct, courts must give great deference to the
professional judgment of military authorities concerning the relative
importance of a particular military interest."208 The Court's deference
in Goldman to the Air Force's considered judgment that its dress code
fostered "the overall group mission" was not mere reflexive yielding to
"government." 209 It was, rather, an acknowledgment of the importance of the military as an essential and special society within the
203. See Edward M. Gaffney et al., An Open Letter to the Religious Community, FIRST
THINGS, Mar. 1991, at 44, 45; Laycock, supra note 152, at 12; Richard John Neuhaus, Polygamy,
Peyote, and the Public Peace, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 1990.
204. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
205. 475 U.S. at 506 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974)).
206. 475 U.S. at 507 (quoting Orloff v. Willoughby, 354 U.S. 83, 92 (1953)).
207. 475 U.S. at 507 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S., 733, 751 (1974)).
208. 475 U.S. at 507.
209. 475 U.S. at 508.

520

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 90:477

larger society, and of the need of that unique subgroup to order the
conditions for its own proper functioning and development. What
gives the Goldman case its special poignancy is that Captain Goldman
was also subject to obligations imposed on him by another community,
a community of faith that he had not ''joined" but to which he simply
belonged. He was not asserting his individual preference against the
dress code, but rather his duty to another code.
Justice O'Connor, in dissent, acknowledged the force of the military's position, but stressed that there was, after all, a constitutional
right weighing heavily on the other side of the dispute. 210 Justice
Brennan's dissent, by contrast, accorded no weight at all to the judgment of the Air Force about what conditions were necessary to maintain its discipline and esprit. 211 He took the occasion to express more
explicitly than ever his particular reading of the religion provisions of
the First Amendment as protecting "the rights of members of minority religions against quiet erosion by majoritarian social institutions
that dismiss minority beliefs and practices as unimportant, because
unfamiliar." 212
Shortly after Goldman was decided, the Court was faced with another claim for a free exercise exemption from a generally applicable
regulation. Unlike in Goldman, however, the regulation involved in
Bowen v. Roy 213 was not constitutive of a community. It concerned,
instead, the ultimate symbol of the bureaucratic state, the social security number that citizens are required to possess and present in order to
be eligible for certain welfare benefits. The perceived need to avoid
unduly burdening the operation of government seemed to induce the
majority in Roy to deny an exemption to Native American parents
who claimed that assigning a social security number to their infant
daughter would violate their religious beliefs by "robbing her spirit" of
the ability to attain greater spiritual power. 214 Chief Justice Burger, in
one of his last opinions for the Court, expressed the concern that,
210. 475 U.S. at 528-29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Congress apparently agreed, for soon
after Goldman was decided, the United States Code was amended to provide a limited free exercise exemption from military dress requirements, reserving, however, a generous measure of dis·
cretion to the Secretary:
[A] member of the armed forces may wear an item of religious apparel while wearing the
uniform of the member's armed force [except] (1) [where] the Secretary determines that the
wearing of the item would interfere with the performance of the member's military duties; or
(2) if the Secretary determines ... that the item of apparel is not neat and conservative.
10 U.S.C.A. § 774 (West Supp. 1991).
211. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 516-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
212. 475 U.S. at 524.
213. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
214. 476 U.S. at 696.
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given the diversity of America's religions and the pervasiveness of
modem government, "virtually every action that the Government
takes, no matter how innocuous it might appear, is potentially susceptible to a Free Exercise objection." 215 Given "the necessity of providing governments with sufficient operating latitude," he concluded,
"some incidental neutral restraints on the free exercise of religion are
inescapable."216 Justice O'Connor, dissenting in part, emphasized, as
she had in Goldman, that an important constitutional right was at
stake for the plaintiffs. This time, the government's bare assertion of
"administrative efficiency" was on the other side of the scales. 217
Bowen v. Roy was followed by a succession of cases where, as in
Roy, free exercise claims were in conflict with regulatory interests of
government. In these, the Court continued to defer to the judgment of
public institutions without inquiring deeply into the rationality· or necessity of the governmental interest involved, or the severity of. the
burden on individual, associational, or institutional free exercise. In
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 218 the Court denied a group of Muslims'
claim for an exemption from generally applicable prison work requirements. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 219 the Court held the government did not need to show a
compelling interest to justify the "incidental" burden on religion resulting from public logging and construction activities in a part of National Forest land Native American groups had traditionally used for
religious purposes. Institutional free exercise claims fell before the
taxing power in Hernandez v. Commissioner, 220 where the Court deferred to the decision of the Internal Revenue Service to deny a charitable deduction for certain payments made to the Church of
Scientology by its members; and in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v.
Board of Equalization, 221 which upheld the imposition of state sales
taxes on the dissemination of religious material. In Tony and Susan
Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, the Court held that a nonprofit religious organization was not exempt from the minimum wage
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act.222
These rulings culminated in an explicit abandonment of strict scru215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

476 U.S. at 707 n.17.
476 U.S. at 712.
476 U.S. at 730 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
482 U.S. 342 (1987).
485 U.S. 439, 450-51 (1988); see also supra text accompanying notes 187-94.
490 U.S. 680 (1989).
110 S. Ct 688 (1990).
471 U.S. 290 (1985).
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tiny for many types of free exercise cases in Employment Division v.
Smith, 223 a case involving the denial of unemployment compensation
to two employees of a drug rehabilitation center who had been fired
from their jobs for using peyote in violation of their employer's substance abuse policy and of Oregon criminal law. Though the peyote
use had been off duty in connection with a Native American religious
ceremony, the state declared the men ineligible for benefits under the
provision of Oregon's unemployment compensation law that disqualifies applicants who have been discharged for work-related misconduct.
The Smith case would have been entirely unremarkable if the
Supreme Court had disposed of the matter by holding that the state's
compelling interest in its drug policy outweighed the free exercise
claims of the discharged employees. However, Justice Scalia's opinion
for the Court not only held that Oregon might require the peyote users
to forfeit unemployment benefits, but ruled the "compelling interest"
standard of Sherbert v. Verner 224 to be inapplicable to challenges of
generally applicable, religion-neutral laws. 225 He concluded that any
accommodation of religious practices by means of an exemption from
a generally applicable law must be provided through the political process, noting that Congress and a large number of states had in fact
exempted sacramental peyote use from criminal penalties. 226
Though Justice O'Connor concurred in the result (which she considered supported by Oregon's interest in enforcing its drug policy),
she took strong issue with the majority's abandonment of the compelling interest standard. As in Goldman and Roy, she insisted that virtual abandonment of scrutiny is inappropriate when a constitutional
right is at stake. 227 The disagreement between Justices O'Connor and
Scalia on the proper standard of review brings into sharp focus the
current division on the Court over free exercise issues. Justice
O'Connor's point that the protection of free exercise cannot constitutionally be left entirely to the political process is a powerful one, but so
is Justice Scalia's point that generally applicable laws with an incidental effect on religious exercise cannot be deemed presumptively
unconstitutional.
223. 110 s. Ct. 1595 (1990).
224. 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see supra text accompanying notes 71-84.
225. 110 S. Ct. at 1603, 1604 n.3.
226. 110 S. Ct. at 1606. One year after Smith was decided, the Oregon legislature exempted
from criminal penalties the use of peyote in connection with "good faith practice of a religious
belief." Since the two men involved in Smith had used peyote as guests at a religious ceremony,
this exemption for people practicing the religion may not have applied to them. Oregon Peyote
Law Leaves 1983 Defendant Unvindicated, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1991, at A14.
227. 110 S. Ct. at 1610-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Each Justice has recognized the validity of the other's argument.
As O'Connor acknowledged in Lyng, "[G]overnment simply could not
operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen's religious needs and
desires." 228 And as Scalia conceded in his dissent in Texas Monthly v.
Bullock, the Court cannot simply accept at face value a state's evaluation of the respective worth of its own regulatory objectives versus a
claimant's interest in exercising his or her religion free of state interference. 229 What Smith brings out into the open is the degree to which
the Court in prior cases had finessed free exercise problems by paying
lip service to a compelling interest test, while in fact according a lower
level of scrutiny to asserted governmental interests. 230
A principled, intermediate balancing approach to free exercise
seems indicated. But what has blocked the development of a consensus on some such approach is the same problem that is responsible for
the disarray of establishment law: the lack of a clear judicial sense of
the purpose and meaning of the Constitution's religion language. Until the Court squarely faces and reaches an operating consensus on
those issues, balancing will be but another name for the more or less
arbitrary exercise of discretion, and outcomes of important cases will
continue to depend on mere majority vote.
The experiences of other liberal pluralistic democracies suggest
that the development of a principled balancing test in the free exercise
area is not an impossible task, and that the difficulties of administering
it would be no greater than those involved with other constitutional
rights. 231 This not to say that Justice Scalia's concerns about releasing
a flood of religion-based litigation are unfounded, nor that he errs in
regarding bright-line rules as useful litigation-avoidance devices. The
difficulties that Scalia anticipates, however, derive in large part from
weaknesses of the American civil litigation system. There is no doubt
that it is more difficult to discourage frivolous claims in the United
States than in countries where court procedures, and rules on costs
and fees, are more effectively deployed toward that end. But responsi228. 485 U.S. at 452.
229. 489 U.S. l, 29-45 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
230. In Smith, Justice Scalia observes, "Although we have sometimes purported to apply the
Sherbert [compelling interest] test in contexts other than [unemployment compensation], we have
always found the test satisfied ...." 110 S. Ct. at 1602; see also McConnell, supra note 152, at
1127 ("[T]he Supreme Court before Smith did not really apply a genuine 'compelling interest'
test. ... Even the Justices committed to the doctrine of free exercise exemptions have in fact
applied a far more relaxed standard to these cases . . . . The 'compelling interest' standard is a
misnomer.").
231. See, for example, the decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany collected in DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 444-503 (1989).
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bility for these shortcomings of our legal system should not be taxed
against the exercise of a fundamental freedom.
Meanwhile, on the establishment front, the Court has also been
adopting a more deferential posture. A glimmer of a possible shift in
that direction appeared as early as 1983, when the Court by a five-tofour majority in Mueller v. Allen upheld a Minnesota law permitting
parents to take a state tax deduction for certain educational expenses
incurred in sending their children to parochial schools. 232 Committee
for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, which in 1973 had
invalidated a state law providing public funds for repair of private
school buildings and a form of tuition grant to parents of private
school children,233 was distinguished. The Court made a somewhat
more decisive move toward increasing its deference to legislative judgments in 1988 in Bowen v. Kendrick, 234 where it upheld a federal program that provided grants to public and private entities (expressly
including religious organizations) for services and research related to
teenage sexuality and pregnancy. The Adolescent Family Life Act
(AFLA), passed by Congress in 1981 in response to the" 'severe adverse health, social, and economic consequences' that often follow
pregnancy and childbirth among unmarried adolescents," 235 provided
for grants "to public or nonprofit private organizations or agencies 'for
services and research in the area of premarital adolescent sexual relations and pregnancy.' " 236 Grants under the Act were intended to
serve several purposes, including the promotion of self-discipline
among adolescents, the encouragement of adoption, the development
of new approaches to the delivery of care and services for pregnant
adolescents, and the support of basic research into the problems associated with adolescent pregnancy.231
Among the services that could be funded under AFLA were pregnancy testing, maternity and adoption counseling, referral services,
prenatal and postnatal health care, provision of nutritional information, child care, mental health services, and educational programs relating to family life and problems associated with adolescent
premarital sexual relations. But Congress placed certain restrictions
on the grant money: no funds were to go to demonstration projects for
family planning services (unless such services were not othenvise
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

463
413
487
487
487
487

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

388 (1983).
756 (1973); see supra text accompanying note 130.
589 (1988).
at 593 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300z(a)(5) (Supp. IV 1986)).
at 593 (quoting S. REP. No. 161, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1981)).
at 593-4; 42 U.S.C. § 300z(b)(l)-(4) (1988).
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available in the community), to groups that provide abortions or abortion counseling, or to groups that advocate, promote, or encourage
abortions.
The controversy these restrictions generated unfortunately eclipsed
the fact that the AFLA represented a serious and important congressional experiment with an alternative method of delivering muchneeded social services. The Senate committee report on the bill had
frankly acknowledged "the limitations of Government in dealing with
a problem that has complex moral and social dimensions," and stated
the committee's belief that "promoting the involvement of religious
organizations in the solution to these problems is neither inappropriate
or illegal." 238 The thought was, apparently, that the use of nongovernmental structures might help provide social services in a less costly
and more effective way than the public sector had been able to accomplish. The AFLA consequently provided that federally funded services in this area should promote the involvement of parents of the
affected children and should "emphasize the provision of support by
other family members, religious and charitable organizations, voluntary associations, and other groups." 239 The effort to secure broadbased involvement of nongovernmental groups was intended by Congress to " 'establish better coordination, integration, and linkages'
among existing programs in the community, ... to aid in the development of 'strong family values and close family ties' and to 'help adolescents and their families deal with complex issues of adolescent
premarital sexual relations and the consequences of such
relations.' " 240
Controversy over the family planning provisions, coupled with the
fact that a number of AFLA grant recipients had institutional ties to
religious denominations, resulted in a legal challenge to the program
as violating the Establishment Clause doctrine formulated in Lemon.
When that lawsuit came before the Court in 1988, Chief Justice Rehnquist examined the constitutionality of AFLA under the Lemon test.
He found that the first prong of the test, the requirement of a secular
purpose, was satisfied because the AFLA was aimed at the elimination
or reduction of social and economic problems caused by teenage sexuality, pregnancy, and parenthood. This purpose was not rendered impermissible because it coincided in some respects with the beliefs of
certain religious organizations. The inclusion of religious organiza238. 487 U.S. at 617-18 (quoting S. REP. No. 161, supra note 236, at 15-16).
239. 487 U.S. at 596 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300z(a)(lO)(C) (1982)).
240. 487 U.S. at 596 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300z(a)(lO)(A), (a)(lO)(C), (b)(3) (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986)).
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tions among the grantees to help achieve these goals also had a secular
purpose, namely, to "improve the effectiveness of the Act's programs. "241 On this point, the Court cited the testimony of a witness
before the Senate Committee to the effect that " 'projects which target
hispanic and other minority populations are more accepted by the
population if they include sectarian, as well as non-sectarian, organizations in the delivery of those services.' " 242 As Mark Chopko has observed, "The goal of serving a genuinely pluralistic community is not
achieved by uniform delivery of services by only one type of
provider. " 243
The Constitution does not rule out such diversified approaches, according to Rehnquist. The Establishment Clause, he wrote, did not
prohibit Congress from recognizing the
important part that religion or religious organizations may play in
resolving certain secular problems.... [I]t seems quite sensible for Congress to recognize that religious organizations can influence values and
can have some influence on family life, including parents' relations with
their adolescent children.
. . . The propriety of this holding, and the long history of cooperation
and interdependence between governments and charitable or religious
organizations is reflected in the legislative history of the AFLA. 244

The controversy surrounding the AFLA's inclusion of religious
groups among grantees illustrates the dramatic shift in the role of religion in American society that has occurred since the Bill of Rights was
adopted. For Americans in the eighteenth century, and "indeed for
generations thereafter, free exercise of religion included freedom of
religious groups to take an active part in regulating family responsibilities, education, health care, poor relief, and various other aspects of
social life that were considered to have a significant moral dimension."245 Gradually, the state has taken over many of the functions
formerly left to religious communities, achieving control over the pro241. 487 U.S. at 605 n.10.
242. 487 U.S. at 2572 n.10 (quoting S. REP. No. 496, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1984)); see also
Susan Chira, Black Churches Renew A Mission: Education, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1991, at Al.
243. Mark E. Chopko,lntentional Values and the Public Interest-A Plea/or Consistency in
Church/State Relations, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1143, 1179 (1990).
244. Kendrick. 487 U.S. at 607, 609. Though the Court held the statute was not facially
invalid, Kendrick did not eliminate the chilling effect of Lemon on legislative experimentation
with cooperative arrangements with religious organizations. The case was remanded to the district court for continued litigation concerning whether any of the grants made pursuant to the
statute were actually being administered in a way that violated the Lemon bans on advancing
religion or excessive entanglement. 487 U.S. at 622.
245. Harold I. Berman, Religious Freedom and the Challenge of the Modern State, in ARTI·
CLES OF FAITH, supra note 120, at 42.
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vision of most primary and secondary education in the nineteenth century, and increasing its presence in the social service area as the
American version of the welfare state developed in the twentieth.
Now that welfare states all over the world seem to be sensing the
limits of their ability to provide social services through public agencies, many governments are exploring partnerships with private organizations, including religious groups. Religious organizations,
traditional providers of social services, especially in the areas of education and health care, will be important resources for societies endeavoring to reach the largest numbers of needy citizens in the most
efficient, effective, and humane ways possible. When we forbid such
joint efforts, "[n]ot only are we substantially deprived of the option of
enlisting church-related social service institutions (a large and richly
experienced institutional sector) in implementing public programs, but
their exclusion often makes it difficult for government to act through
private sector institutions at all," because politicians are loath to appear to be discriminating against their religious constituents. 246
Under the strict separationist approach favored by what was by
then a group of dissenters in Kendrick, the participation of religious
groups in creative new approaches to homelessness, child care, and
care for victims of AIDS and other disabling illnesses would be
sharply restricted. Though Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, agreed that the AFLA had a legitimate
secular purpose, he argued that it violated the Lemon test by advancing religion. "Whereas there may be secular values promoted by the
AFLA," Justice Blackmun wrote, "including the encouragement of
adoption and premarital chastity and the discouragement of abortion,
it can hardly be doubted that when promoted in theological terms by
religious figures, those values take on a religious nature." 247
Moreover, Blackmun speculated, statutes like the AFLA might actually pose a threat to participating religious groups. By enlisting
their aid in carrying out social programs while subjecting them to
First Amendment restrictions, he warned,
we risk secularizing and demeaning the sacred enterprise. Whereas there
is undoubtedly a role for churches of all denominations in helping prevent the problems often associated with early sexual activity and unplanned pregnancies, any attempt to confine that role within the strictures of
a government-sponsored secular program, can only taint the religious
mission with a "corrosive secularism." 248
246. MORGAN, supra note 27, at 41.
247. Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 639 (Blackrnun, J., dissenting).
248. 487 U.S. at 640 n.10 (quoting School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385
(1985)).
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The "strictures" to which Blackmun refers, of course, were imposed not by the First Amendment, but by the Lemon test and its
predecessors. Kendrick demonstrated, however, that a majority of the
Court was increasingly uneasy with Lemon's rigid categories.
But, as a case decided the following year plainly revealed, the Justices who were dissatisfied with Lemon were far from united on what
to do about it. In County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties
Union, a group of plaintiffs had brought an action challenging, on establishment grounds, the display of a nativity scene and a menorah on
public property during the December holiday season. 249 The plurality
opinion, authored by Justice Blackmun, held that the display of the
creche violated Lemon's prohibition against advancing religion, while
the display of the menorah next to a Christmas tree in another location did not. 250 Like other symbol cases, the Allegheny decision seems
to us to be more interesting for the light it sheds on the assumptions
under which the Justices were operating than for its result.
Justice O'Connor concluded that the results were justifiable on the
basis of "careful line drawing" under the unique circumstances of each
case, but she warned that the Court must avoid "drawing lines which
entirely sweep away all government recognition and acknowledgment
of the role of religion in the lives of our citizens for to do so would
exhibit not neutrality but hostility to religion." 251 She took the occasion to advance again the substitute for the Lemon test that she had
formulated and proposed in an earlier case involving a Christmas display, Lynch v. Donnelly. 252 The proper way to approach establishment
cases, she suggested, was to review each challenged governmental
practice "in its unique circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion." 253 This endorsement
test, she explained, rested on the recognition that Court decisions regarding matters of great moment send "messages" to the public at
large. The proposed test, she argued, "captures the essential command of the Establishment Clause, namely, that government must not
make a person's religious beliefs relevant to his or her standing in the
political community by conveying a message 'that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.' " 2 5 4
249. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
250. 492 U.S. at 621.
251. 492 U.S. at 623 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (citation
omitted).
252. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
253. 492 U.S. at 625.
254. 492 U.S. at 627 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., con·
curring in the judgment)).
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Justice Kennedy, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and White, concurred in the holding that there was
no Establishment Clause violation in the case of the menorah, but dissented from the holding that the creche display advanced religion.
The much-criticized Lemon test, he argued, accorded too little latitude
for recognizing the central role of religion in society to serve as the
Court's primary guide for resolving establishment cases. Like Justice
O'Connor, he was concerned about the message the Court's religion
decisions were sending. But wher~s she concentrated primarily on
the dangers of an exclusionary message to nonadherents, his attention
was fixed mainly on the undesirability of a message of hostility to religion. Two limiting principles, Justice Kennedy suggested, were available in the Court's precedents to prevent legitimate accommodation of
religion from becoming illegitimate establishment:
[G]overnment may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any
religion or its exercise; and it may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility
or callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a degree
that it in fact "establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to
do so." 255

The old, strict, separationist view was maintained in Allegheny by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, all of whom joined in opinions
written by Brennan and Stevens, concurring in the Court's decision to
bar the creche and dissenting from, the decision to permit display of
the menorah. 256
The next year, the fragmented Lemon critics in Allegheny joined in
an opinion upholding against an establishment challenge the application of the federal Equal Access Act to require a high school to extend
the same privilege to a student religious group to meet on school
premises after hours as it had extended to nonreligious student groups
and clubs. 257
As matters stood in the fall of 1991, six members of the high court
were on record as dissatisfied with Lemon v. Kurtzman's separationist
test for determining whether the establishment provision had been violated.258 The Court seemed on the verge of replacing Lemon, either
255. 492 U.S. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
256. 492 U.S. at 637 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
257. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
258. For Justices Kennedy, Scalia, O'Connor, Rehnquist, and White, see Allegheny, 492 U.S.
at 655-56 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice David
Souter, when asked in his confirmation hearings about his view of the Court's approach to
church-state issues, commented, "The concerns that have been raised about [the Lemon test]
naturally provoke a search, not only perhaps for a different test of the standard which we think
we are applying today, but a deeper re-examination about the very concept behind the establish-
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with the deferential standard proposed by Justice Kennedy, under
which government would be forbidden only to coerce or proselytize,
or with the modified separationist test proposed by Justice O'Connor,
under which government would be barred from "endorsing" religion. 259 Together with the retreat from the compelling interest test in
cases involving requests for exemptions from generally applicable
laws, the adoption of the Kennedy, or even the O'Connor, standard
would move the Court closer to a unified, across-the-board deferential
approach in church-state matters.
A new posture of deference would have certain virtues. It would
be more respectful of the significant regional cultural variations that
exist in this country, of local control, and of democratic political
processes. It would relieve the courts, to a great extent, from having
to make decisions on such perplexing issues as the definition of a religion, the sincerity of a person's religious belief, and the relative weight
of governmental interests and burdens on religious belief and practice.
It would facilitate governmental utilization of mediating structures to
help deliver a variety of badly needed social services. In so doing, it
might help to promote important forms of free exercise, especially by
permitting legislatures to help parents regain a measure of control over
their children's moral and educational development. That so much
attention and energy have been expended on litigation over prayer in
the public schools is symptomatic, we believe, of displaced concern
about a deeper issue: the growing sense of many parents that they do
not have a meaningful say in their children's education. 260
Ultimately, however, simply adopting a more deferential test will
not promote a better understanding of how the free exercise and establishment portions of the Religion Clause should interact to protect
religious freedom. A mechanically applied deferential approach could
ment clause." Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court to Take Fresh Look at Disputed Church·State
Boundary, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1991, at Al6.
259. More compatible with the structural method advocated here would be an approach that
would take as its starting point the positive liberty created by the First Amendment's religious
freedom guarantee and the governmental obligations flowing therefrom. The protection of religious freedom would seem to require liberty-enhancing governmental accommodation, but not
sponsorship, of religious expression. For an attempt (pre-Allegheny) to work out the appropriate
scope and limits of an evenhanded accommodationist approach aimed at promoting religious
pluralism as a public value while protecting individual and institutional religious freedom from
governmental interference, see Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP.
Cr. REv. 1. In a later article, McConnell wrote: "The Court should not ask, 'Will this advance
religion?,' but rather, 'Will this advance pluralism?' The Court should not ask, 'Will this be
religiously divisive?,' but rather, 'Will this tend to suppress expression of religious differences?' "
McConnell, supra note 24, at 1516.
260. See Parents Support Choice For Schools, Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1991, at DIS;
see also Ellen Goodman, Parents Overwhelmed by the Culture, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 1991, at
C9, and infra Part IV.
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be subversive of individual, associational, and institutional free exercise, especially where small, unconventional, or unpopular religions
are concerned. As Justice Scalia bluntly acknowledged in Employment Division v. Smith, "leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that
are not widely engaged in ...." 261 Indeed, near-automatic deference
to the elected branches would pose a menace to free exercise by members of America's diverse assortment of larger religious groups as well.
For the emerging deferential approach raises doubts about the extent
to which the Court will continue to accord constitutional scrutiny to
governmental use of taxing and regulatory powers to infringe on religious organizations. If Smith does, as many fear, represent the
Court's adoption of a reflexive, mechanical form of deference, the results could be as inimical to religious freedom as they were under the
old separationist approaches. 2 62
Neither rigid separationism nor mechanical deference comports
with the language and history of the Constitution, for as Justice
O'Connor pointed out in her concurring opinion in Smith, the First
Amendment requires positive protection for the religious liberty of
Americans. "[T]he First Amendment unequivocally makes freedom
of religion, like freedom from race discrimination and freedom of
speech, a 'constitutional nor[m],'" a "preferred" right, singled out by
the Framers for "special protections."2 63
In our view, however, Smith does not necessarily portend a definitive move to a rigid and mechanical posture of deference. In the first
place, Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court does not purport to represent a comprehensive reordering of a body of law that took over forty
years to become unprincipled and unworkable. Second, the bare result
of the case, amply justified by Oregon's drug enforcement policy, is
scarcely an innovation. And third, the Smith opinion itself acknowledges the continuing need for careful scrutiny in certain types of cases.
The principal problem with Smith - as with Bowen v. Roy,
261. 110 s. Ct. 1595, 1606 (1990).
262. Michael McConnell has compiled an admonitory list of examples of the inroads into
religious freedom that might result if the Court adopts a reflexive deferential approach: orthodox
Jews could be required to end sexual segregation in their places of worship; Catholic doctors in
public hospitals could be fired for refusing to perform abortions; public school students might be
forced to attend sex education classes contrary to their faith; orthodox Jewish athletes might be
excluded from sports teams unless they relinquished their religious head covering; prisons would
not be required to respect the dietary laws binding Jewish or Muslim prisoners; the Catholic
church might be required to hire female priests; and historic preservation laws might be used to
prevent churches from making theologically significant alterations to their structures. McConnell, supra note 152, at 1142-43.
263. 110 S. Ct. at 1612 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting McConnell, supra note 259, at 9).
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O'Lone v. Estate ofShahbaz, Hernandez v. Commissioner, and Jimmy
Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization - is the current majority's readiness to accept unsupported government assertions about the
nature and strength of its interests, without reckoning the likely burdens in each case on free exercise. 264 As Justices O'Connor and Kennedy have rightly emphasized, the Court's religion decisions not only
resolve disputes brought before the Court but also send "messages" to
the public and to the other branches of govemment. 265 Smith, in its
broadest implications, would cancel the wholesome message of earlier
free exercise decisions to legislators, administrators, local officials,
school boards, and the like that the Constitution requires government
to accommodate religious practices where it can do so without seriously burdening governmental interests. As Michael McConnell has
pointed out, "[m]any, if not most, of the accommodations found in
state and federal statutes were enacted in response to the argument
that they were constitutionally required." 2 66
We consider it unlikely that the broadest statements in Smith will
be taken to their limits by the current majority. Keeping in mind that
it required decades for the law in the church-state area to arrive at its
present tangled condition, it seems reasonable to expect a few fits, and
even false starts, as the Court strives to work out a better way of dealing with the sensitive and immensely complex issues involved in these
cases. It is possible, of course, that the Rehnquist Court, like previous
Courts, will, without much deliberation, brush the freedom of religion
aside while it pursues an unrelated constitutional agenda. Smith may,
as some fear, be the decisive step toward a reflexive majoritarianism as
insensitive to the concerns of "incorrigibly religious" Americans as
was the antimajoritarianism of the rights revolution. But a more plausible trajectory is that Smith in time will come to be seen as mainly
explicable in relation to a strong national policy relating to a severe
national problem. That is, just as Bob Jones is more of an antidiscrimination case than a Religion Clause case, so Smith may tum out
to be primarily a drug case - a step, rather than a landmark, in the
process of rationalizing and reconstructing Religion Clause case law.
The current Court's dissatisfaction with the old strict separationist
approach and its more recent, weaker versions presents the Court with
an opportunity to reconstruct its Religion Clause jurisprudence. Having cleared away the barriers imposed by the "wall of separation," the
264. See supra notes 220-31 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 252-55 and accompanying text.
266. Michael McConnell, The Amazing, Disappearing, Free Exercise Clause (unpublished
manuscript on file with the authors).
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Court can begin to knit together the severed halves of the Religion
Clause, orienting both toward the service of religious freedom. The
demise of the rigorously separationist approach may release "free exercise" from its narrow interpretation and from its long subordination
to a broad construction of "establishment." If the Court were to begin
to restore both parts of the Religion Clause to the service of freedom
of religion, the problem of developing principled limits on free exercise
would become more susceptible of reasoned resolution. For it would
be seen not as governed by the extra-constitutional principle of separationism, but as involving the interplay of free exercise with other constitutional values, of varying weights under the circumstances of
actual cases. 267
The new posture of deference, it seems to us, is the first stage of a
gradual transition to a flexible but principled approach that will treat
the Religion Clause as a whole. The foundations of such a reconstruction of Religion Clause law are already present in various decisions,
dissents, and concurrences authored by members of the Smith majority. Prominent among the elements that can be expected to promote
the development of a more principled and workable body of Religion
Clause law are Chief Justice Rehnquist's careful attention to history in
Wallace v. Jajfree, 268 his often-expressed solicitude for the role of religion as a mediating structure,269 and his Hamiltonian respect for federalism and the separation of powers. Justice O'Connor has displayed
a serious concern with the religion issues as they bear on the lives of
citizens, 270 solicitude for all points of view, 271 a prudent inclination to
proceed cautiously case by case,272 and a persistence in demanding factual and legal justification.273 These traits will be essential to bringing
267. See infra Part IV.
268. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text; infra notes 298-306
and accompanying text.
269. See infra notes 28~-96 and accompanying text.
270. For example:
Judicial review of government action under the Establishment Clause is a delicate task. The
Court has avoided drawing lines which entirely sweep away all government recognition and
acknowledgment of the role of religion in the lives of our citizens for to do so would exhibit
not neutrality but hostility to religion.
Allegheny County v. A.C.L.U., 492 U.S. 573, 623 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
in the judgment).
271. E.g., "There is an element of truth and much helpful analysis in each of these suggestions ...." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 79 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
(referring to critiques of existing establishment tests).
272. For example, her discussion of the need for careful line-drawing in Allegheny, 492 U.S.
at 623 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
273. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 421 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (questioning assertion that public school teachers tutoring on premises of religious schools will necessarily inculcate religion).
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the rich resources of traditional common law judging to bear on
problems to which the Court in the past has given short shrift. 274 Another likely important factor is Justice Kennedy's constant alertness to
the ways that purported neutrality can mask hostility to religion, a
concern that in many cases cannot be alleviated without some scrutiny
of the purposes and effects of laws that appear to be neutral on their
face. 275 Finally, Justice Scalia's fresh reading in Smith of the free-exercise decisions may have opened the way to a more holistic approach
of the type that we advocate here. After Smith, it seems more likely
that future Religion Clause cases will continue to be resolved in the
light of the interplay among various constitutional values.
Justice O'Connor best summed up the current state of affairs in a
speech on the bicentennial of the Religion Clause in the spring of
1991. The Court, she said, was "at a crossroads," with existing doctrine "quite fragile" and with the members of the Court "narrowly
and deeply divided." 276 The only certainty was that debate among the
members of the Court would continue and that the problems would
not be susceptible of easy resolution. We find her sober assessment
encouraging, for it suggests that the current Court may be prepared to
accord the Religion Clause the serious attention it has long merited
and seldom received.211
IV.

STRUCTURAL FREE EXERCISE

With hindsight, the innocent catalyst for the train of events that
brought Religion Clause jurisprudence to its present tangled state
seems to have been the piecemeal approach to incorporation. The process of reviewing the various parts of the Bill of Rights separately, at
intervals, set the stage for interpreting the establishment and free exercise provisions as embodying independent sets of ideas, thus obscuring
their common purpose. An earnest struggle at the time of incorporation with the special interpretive difficulties that incorporation
presented in the religion area would in all probability have averted
274. Justice Souter, like Justice O'Connor, was an experienced state court judge before join·
ing the Court. As of May 1991, his voting pattern resembled that of Justice O'Connor more
closely than that of any other Justice. Linda Greenhouse, Another Frantic Finish Loams far High
Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1991, at A20.
275. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part); Board of Educ. v. Mergens,
110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
276. Reported in Rob Boston, Religious Liberty at the Crossroads, CHURCH & STATE, July·
Aug. 1991, at 4, 5.
277. The Court heard oral argument in Lee v. Weisman, a challenge to the constitutionality
of prayers at public school graduation ceremonies, on November 6, 1991. See Linda Green·
house, Justices Appear Wary in Argument Over Prayer at Schaal Graduations, N.Y. TIMES, No·
vember 7, 1991, at A14.
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many subsequent missteps. But the Court's early resort to the simplistic "wall" metaphor ensconced separationism as an end in itself,
thereby driving a wedge between the free exercise and establishment
provisions and creating the appearance of tension between them. The
two-clause approach in tum produced two largely separate bodies of
case law. Moreover, the adoption of bright-line tests for establishment
cases and balancing tests for free exercise meant that the classification
of a dispute as a free exercise or establishment case was often determinative of its outcome. 278 Over time, court majorities gave a narrow
construction to free exercise, neglecting its associational and institutional aspects. These important dimensions of religious freedom further suffered from the Court's broad construction of the First
Amendment's establishment language. The effect was to regularly
subordinate the free exercise of religion to the policy of enforcing a
rigid separation of church and state. In case after case, as we have
seen, the First Amendment was thus turned on its head.
Ordinarily, a question of c_onstitutional interpretation of such difficulty and import would galvanize the legal academy. Constitutional
law scholars, however, for the most part have uncritically accepted the
Court's ahistorical approach. With a few notable exceptions,279 they,
too, have tended to treat nonestablishment as the basic end to which
some derogation might cautiously be allowed in order to accommodate the free exercise of religion. Laurence Tribe, for example, in his
widely used treatise, describes the free exercise provision as "carv[ing]
out" a "zone" where "permissible accommodation" of religious interests may take place. 2 80
From time to time, the advance of the separationist position was
interrupted, as we have seen, when Court majorities drew back from
taking it to its furthest logical extremes.281 Various explanations have
been advanced for these occasional aberrations: Justice Douglas' ambitions for the presidency for a brief period in the 1950s;282 Justice
278. Developments in the Law, supra note 9, at 1609-10, 1723 n.101 (1987).
279. See especially McConneU, supra note 24; NOONAN, supra note 11.
280. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 1169.
281. Walz v. Tax Commn. of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding against establishment challenge a statute granting tax exemptions to religious organizations for religious properties used solely for religious purposes as part of a larger scheme of exemptions for property used
exclusively for religious, educational, or charitable purposes); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236 (1968) (upholding against establishment challenge a state law requiring local public sch6ol
authorities to lend textbooks free of charge to a11 students in grades 7-12, including those in
private religious schools); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding against establishment challenge a statute which required the release, at parents' request, of public school students
during the school day to attend religion classes); see also supra notes 107-21 and accompanying
text (discussing Walz).
282. In 1952, Douglas maintained that the Constitution was never meant to require equal
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Brennan's concern for the associational rights of selected minority
groups during his long tenure on the bench; and what Mark Tushnet
has called a "marginality principle" permitting the free exercise of religion when the issue at stake seemed harmless or unimportant to secular-minded judges. 283 Occasionally, as when the Court upheld the
traditional tax exemption for church property in Walz, the Justices
seemed to realize that the logic of extreme separationism was profoundly threatening to the religious liberty of millions of Americans.
These sporadic departures from separationism prompted friends and
foes of the principle to castigate the Court for inconsistency. 284 In
retrospect, however, as we have shown, the Court was fairly consistent
for some forty years in pursuing an individualistic, secularist, and separationist approach to religion cases.
A majority of the members of the current Court now appear to
have concluded that the Religion Clause jurisprudence of the past fifty
years is seriously flawed. They are far from unanimous, however, on
their diagnosis of the problems, or on their idea of the appropriate
remedies. A loose coalition on the current Court has come perilously
close to disposing of the difficulties in the area by throwing the First
Amendment's religious freedom guarantee out with the bathwater of
forty years of separationist case law. 285 Their emerging deferential approach could, in effect, "unincorporate" the religion language of the
First Amendment. This, it seems to us, would be a regrettable outcome. For the effect would be to send a message that religious freedom is not "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,''286 and that the
freedom the Framers placed first in the Bill of Rights is not entitled to
a prominent place on the twentieth century's "honor roll of superior
rights." 287
As we have argued, however, that is not the inevitable trajectory of
the current Court's reconsideration of a body of law that took many
decades to reach its present unworkable state. Discernible in the opinions of a majority of the current Justices are the elements of a new
approach that we call structural free exercise. We use the word structreatment for nonbelievers, and he espoused a view of free exercise that encompassed each reli·
gious organization's freedom to "flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of
its dogma." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). In the 1970s, however, he warned
against augmenting the power of "organized religion" in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 247
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part), and "religious organizations" in Walz v. Tax Commn. of
New York, 397 U.S. 664, 700 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
283. Tushnet, supra note 9, at 723.
284. See sources cited supra note 9.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 199-231, 261-66.
286. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
287. See ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 74.
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tural in an organic, rather than a mechanical, sense to refer to the
relations within and among texts, and between legal and social institutions. The structural approach situates the religion language within its
historical and literary context. It takes into consideration the institutional and associational, as well as the individual, aspects of religious
freedom. It is informed by an awareness of the role of America's religions in the cultural foundations of the democratic experiment.
Much of the theoretical groundwork for a structural approach to
the Religion Clause can be found in various writings of Chief Justice
Rehnquist. In 1978, then-Justice Rehnquist gave the keynote address
of a University of Miami Law School lecture series on the topic "The
Adversary Society." 288 In that speech he chose to stress the crucial
roles that nongovernmental institutions play in our society. He expressed concern about the pressure on the courts from ideological litigants to resolve controversies that previously had been left largely to
regulation by other social and political institutions. Noting the disruptive effect that adversarial proceedings can have on ongoing social relations and structures, he suggested that protection of such relations
and structures ought to be one factor in policymakers' evaluation of
the desirability of alternative methods of dispute resolution.
As an example of an appropriate sensitivity to the need to protect
the internal autonomy of social structures from governmental interference, he cited the Supreme Court's 1976 refusal, in Serbian Eastern
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 289 to overturn the decision of an ecclesiastical tribunal regarding a property dispute between two factions
of a church. In a democracy, Justice Rehnquist explained, it is sometimes necessary to reject certain claims of individuals, and to attach
"special weight" to institutions, like unions, churches, and other communities of memory and mutual aid. "While this should not confer
upon them ... a power to ride roughshod over the claims of individuals," he said, occasional deference to such institutions is justified in
situations where "adversary litigation of the propriety of [internal] decisions would have more disadvantageous consequences in terms of
diminishing the usefulness of the institution than would the ultimate
resolution by the court of the claim of individual right." 290 At the
conclusion of his lecture, he reflected, "Those who make our laws ...
serve us poorly if they do not recognize that the world in which we live
is an intricate web of relationships between people, private institutions
288. See William H. Rehnquist, The Adversary Society, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1978).
289. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
290. Rehnquist, supra note 288, at 8, 18.
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and government at its various levels."29 1
As Chief Justice, Rehnquist has carried forward the vision of federalism, the separation of powers, and the institutions of civil society
outlined in the Miami speech. In Bowen v. Kendrick, 292 he made it
clear that the Court was not disposed to cooperate with litigants bent
on using the establishment provision to undermine legislative efforts to
include religious organizations along with other mediating structures
in programs designed to attack pressing social problems. The reason
Congress had expressly mandated the participation of a variety of
community organizations - religious groups among them - in the
teenage pregnancy program, he pointed out, was "to spark the development of new, innovative services."293 Signaling that ideological
plaintiffs would in the future find it more difficult to block such experiments, he wrote: "Nothing in our previous cases prevents Congress
from ... recognizing the important part that religion or religious organizations may play in resolving certain secular problems."294 He
pointed to the country's "long history of cooperation and interdependency between governments and charitable or religious organizations," and to the fact that the provision of social services by
religiously affiliated charitable groups has long taken place without
controversy and with community support. 295 "This Court," he said,
"has never held that religious institutions are disabled by the First
Amendment from participating in publicly sponsored social welfare
programs. " 296
Bowen v. Kendrick thus represented a significant repair of the road
that had led to Aguilar v. Felton. 291 A thorough reconstruction, however, would have to begin with the abandonment of the Lemon test,
and the assumption of the long-neglected task of interpreting the Religion Clause in the light of its history and purposes. The Chief Justice
laid down the basis for that essential work in his scholarly dissent in
Wallace v. Jajfree. 298 Canvassing the history of the provision, including the pertinent statements of the Framers, the actual organization of
church-state relations in the various states at the time the Bill of
Rights was adopted, and the evidence concerning the way the religion
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Id. at 18.
589 (1988); see supra notes 234-48 and accompanying text.
at 604.
at 607.
at 609.
at 609.
402 (1985). See supra notes 157-85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
487
487
487
487
487
473

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
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language had been understood during the nineteenth century, Rehnquist found the record barren of any suggestion that the establishment
language makes separationism a distinct goal, rather than a means to
promote religious freedom. The Chief Justice's examination of the
proceedings of the first Congress leading up to the adoption of the
First Amendment, the actions of the first and subsequent Congresses
touching on religious matters, and the writings of leading nineteenthcentury constitutional commentators also confirmed that nothing in
the establishment provision had been intended to require the government to be neutral as between religion and nonreligion. 299 All the evidence suggested a "well-accepted meaning" for the establishment
provision: The Framers intended the Establishment Clause to prohibit
the designation of any "national religion" and "forbade preference
among religious sects or denominations. " 300
The Establishment Clause did not require government neutrality between religion and irreligion nor did it prohibit the Federal Government
from providing nondiscriminatory aid to religion. There is simply no
historical foundation for the proposition that the Framers intended to
build the "wall of separation" that was constitutionalized in Everson. 301

The Chief Justice went on to concede that a lack of historical basis
for the "theory of rigid separation"302 would not in itself be a reason
to begin anew if the theory in operatic:m had yielded a unified and principled body of case law. The record of decisions from Everson 303 onward, however, showed that the opposite had been the case.
"Whether due to its lack of historical support or its practical unworkability, the Everson 'wall' has proved all but useless as a guide to
sound constitutional adjudication." 304 The Lemon 305 test, he continued, suffered from the same defects as the wall concept. It lacked any
grounding in the language or purpose of the First Amendment, and it
had proved incapable of generating adequate standards for the principled decision of Religion Clause cases. 306
299. Also concluding that protection of free exercise was not meant to apply to nonreligion
are Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579,
597-604, Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41
STAN. L. REV. 233, 236 (1989), and McConnell, supra note 24, at 1495.
300. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
301. 472 U.S. at 106.
302. 472 U.S. at 106.
303. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); see supra notes 22-45 and accompanying
text.
304. 472 U.S. at 107.
305. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see supra notes 125-29 and accompanying
text.
306. 472 U.S. at 110.
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The Religion Language in Context

Rehnquist's dissent in Wallace v. Jajfree prepared the way for the
Court to undertake the careful interpretive process that should have
occurred in the 1940s, a process that would commence, in the usual
way, with a consideration of the textual passage as a whole, in the light
of its history, purposes, and its relation to other parts of the Bill of
Rights. When and if the Court proceeds to that step, however, its path
will not be free of difficulty. Consider the familiar language of the
First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. " 307
Grammatically, this famous sentence contains no "clauses" at all.
(A clause, the reader will recall from school days, is a word group
containing a subject and a predicate, and constituting part of a compound or complex sentence. 308) The First Amendment is what grammarians call a simple sentence. Its structure contains a subject
(Congress), a verb (shall make), and an object (law), followed by three
participial phrases serving as adjectival modifiers that tell us what kind
of law Congress is forbidden to make. The word clause, of course, has
an additional meaning. Thus, according to Webster's Second, a clause
can also be "[a] short sentence, a separate portion of a discourse or
writing; a distinct article, stipulation, or proviso, in a formal document. "309 It is in this sense that lawyers speak of the "clauses" of
contracts, statutes, pleadings, wills, treaties, and constitutions. And it
is in this sense that the First Amendment may be said to contain a
clause, or clauses, pertaining to religion.
But which is it? Are there two separate propositions - that Congress may not establish a religion and that Congress may not prohibit
the free exercise of religion? Or is there but one proposition - that
Congress may not interfere with freedom of religion, either by establishing a religion or by otherwise prohibiting its free exercise? The
interpretive problem is not free of difficulty.
Nor is it entirely clear from the text precisely what sort of activity
Congress was banned from undertaking in the establishment area. If
307. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
308. The second edition of Webster's New International Dictionary (1958) defines a "clause,"
in the grammatical sense, as "[a] word group formed by subject and predicate elements but
constituting a member of a complex or compound sentence instead of ranking as a completed
sentence."
309. Id.

December 1991]

Structural Free Exercise

541

the intent was solely to prevent the founding of a national religion,
why does the establishment phrase not simply say so? The broader
formulation chosen - forbidding Congress to make any law "respecting an establishment of religion" - suggests that the Framers' purpose was not merely to promote freedom of religion by banning a
national religion, but to insulate and protect the various existing statelevel arrangements from congressional interference. 310 The meaning
of this language, and the puzzle of whether and how to make it applicable against the states, posed formidable problems that the Court in
the incorporation era simply ignored.
What light, if any, does the First Amendment context of the religion language shed on these questions? The First Amendment, read
as a whole, forbids Congress to interfere with a group of important
freedoms. The provisions dealing with religious freedom were placed
first among this group, followed by the familiar protections for speech,
the press, and the right of the people to assemble and to petition for
redress of grievances. The structure of the amendment suggests that
the subject of protection in the first participial phrase is religious freedom, just as freedom of speech, press, assembly, and petition are the
subjects of protection in the following two phrases. If the two religion
provisions are read together in the light of an overarching purpose to
protect freedom of religion, most of the tension between them disappears. They are complementary provisions, both in the service of the
same fundamental right. They bar Congress from abridging religious
freedom in one specific way (by legislation "respecting an establishment of religion"), and in general ("or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof").
Naturally, these interpretive questions cannot be resolved on the
basis of First Amendment text and its history alone, for the First
Amendment itself has a context: the Bill of Rights and the overall
constitutional design for government. 311 When the religion language
is situated in this larger context, further light is shed on its role within
the constitutional and social order.
B.

The Religion Clause and the Structure of the Bill of Rights

The fate of the First Amendment's religion language has been
closely bound to the development of post-incorporation Bill of Rights
310. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833); Amar, supra note 25, at 1157.
311. As John H. Mansfield has observed, "[T]here is a need for a more encompassing and
clearer view of both of the religion clauses of the first amendment and also of the relation between the religion clauses and other provisions of the Constitution." Mansfield, supra note 26 at
847.
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interpretation generally. From the mid-1950s onward, this process
was characterized by the tendency of many judges and legal scholars
to place selected individual and minority rights at the apex of constitutional values. In an entirely appropriate response to pervasive racism
in our society, the courts in the period of the rights revolution invoked
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to withdraw a number of issues from legislative and local control. As time
went on, however, judicial practices that originated and found their
justification in the historic struggle to deal with one of the nation's
most serious social problems were brought into play with regard to an
expanding variety of political and civil liberties. A large segment of
the legal community came to regard the entire Bill of Rights as in the
service of individual and minority rights.
Akhil Amar points out in a recent article that the judges and scholars who have championed individual and minority rights, regarding
state and local governments as threats to those rights, have given special prominence to one part of our constitutional tradition at the expense of others. 312 What has been obscured and subordinated in this
process is the older and equally important element of American constitutionalism that was designed to protect majorities ("the people")
from centralized and sometimes unrepresentative control. 31 3 Since the
Bill of Rights embodies both traditions in its interlocking parts, it cannot be read in "discrete chunks" without loss to all Americans.314
Amar's examination of legal scholarship on the Bill of Rights
reveals that teachers and writers in the law schools have not presented
the Bill of Rights holistically, as a document with certain themes
whose parts are related to these themes and to one another. Instead,
tracking the "peculiar logistics" of incorporation, constitutional law
scholars have tended to approach the Bill of Rights as a string of discrete blocks of text, "with each bit examined in isolation."3 15 In taking that approach, they have also neglected the relationship of the Bill
of Rights to the rest of the Constitution, treating the design for government and the protection of individual rights in most respects as two
separate domains - the former largely governed by the main body of
the Constitution, and the latter belonging to the realm of the Bill of
Rights.
What is of particular relevance to the problem at hand is that a
clause-by-clause approach to the Bill of Rights thrusts the individual
312.
313.
314.
315.

Amar, supra note 25.
Id. at 1136.
Id. at 1131, 1201.
Id. at 1136, 1131.
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rights it contains into the foreground, while obscuring the democratic
themes that run through the document as a whole. As Amar neatly
puts it:
Of course individual and minority rights did constitute a motif of the
Bill of Rights - but not the sole, or even the dominant, motif. A close
look at the Bill reveals structural ideas tightly interconnected with language of rights; states' rights and majority rights alongside individual
and minority rights; and protection of various intermediate associations
- church, militia, and jury - designed to create an educated and virtuous electorate. The main thrust of the Bill was not to downplay organizational structure, but to deploy it; not to impede popular majorities, but
to empower them. 316

The tendency of contemporary judges and scholars to overlook the
fact that the Bill of Rights as a whole contains important democratic
themes has deprived them of an important aid to the understanding
and construction of the First Amendment's religion language. Situating the religion provisions within the context of the Bill of Rights as
a whole would have brought out the relationships between those provisions and the "structural ideas" Amar mentioned. Such a holistic
reading lends considerable support to the view Justice Stewart plaintively voiced in Sherbert v. Verner 317 nearly thirty years ago that the
free exercise guarantee was meant to apply to all Americans, majorities as well as minorities. It reinforces the likelihood that the establishment language was meant to protect the diverse local arrangements
that the citizens of the several states had made with respect to religion.
And it makes it reasonable to suppose that "the people" were to be
protected, not only in their solitary individual religious beliefs and
practices, but in the associations and institutions where those beliefs
and practices were generated, regenerated, nurtured, promoted, and
transmitted.
A structural approach also suggests that the Bill of Rights is not
only a catalog of negative individual liberties, but a charter of "positive protection"318 for certain structures of civil society, notably religious organizations, community militia, and juries. Far from being
"neutral" with regard to these structures, Amendments One, Two,
Six, and Seven single them out for special treatment, and not just in
disputes decided by judges, for the Bill of Rights is addressed to legislators as well.
A structural reading of the Bill of Rights reminds us that the
Founders attached particular importance to the kinds of rights that
316. Id. at 1132.
317. 374 U.S. 398, 415-16 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring in result).
318. 374 U.S. at 415-16. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
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help to create conditions for the exercise of other rights. When Alexander Hamilton famously described the Constitution as "itself . . . a
Bill of Rights," he was calling attention to the fact that representative
institutions, federalism, checks and balances, and the separation of
powers all work together to help set conditions conducive to the flourishing of democratic self-govemment. 319 Similarly, those features of
the Bill of Rights that accord constitutional status to certain intermediate associations - religious groups foremost among them - were
designed in part to promote self-government by fostering participation
in public life, protecting the seedbeds of civic virtue, and educating
citizens about their rights and obligations. The nonestablishment provision of the First Amendment, for example, served to shelter from
governmental interference "'the pluralistic structure of the background social institutions necessary to make [religious] choice both
possible and meaningful.' " 320 In this, as in other respects, it does not
stand against, but works in harmony with, the free exercise provision.
A holistic reading thus suggests that individual free exercise cannot be treated in isolation from the need of religious associations and
their members for a protected sphere within which they can provide
for the definition, development, and transmission of their own beliefs
and practices. This was Chief Justice Rehnquist's premise in his 1978
Miami lecture on our "adversarial society." 321 Contemporary commentators and courts, however, have tended to concentrate primarily
on the more narrowly individual aspects of religious liberty, overlooking the fact that, for many individuals, free exercise is inherently associational. 322 With rare exceptions, 323 the Supreme Court has been
relatively insensitive to the ways in which individual free exercise is
mediated through organizations, and to the needs of these organizations and their members for a protected space within which each
group may "flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the
appeal of its dogma." 324 Whatever the deficiencies of the Court's
319. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 510, 515 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (emphasis omitted).
320. Developments in the Law, supra note 9, at 1638 (quoting Note, Reinterpreting the Reli·
gion Clauses: Constitutional Construction and Conceptions of the Self, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1468,
1475 (1984)).
321. See supra notes 288-91 and accompanying text.
322. Developments in the Law, supra note 9, at 1742, 1770.
323. Notably, Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
426 U.S. 696 (1976); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See also supra notes 131-47
(discussing Yoder).
324. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
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treatment of individual free exercise over the years, 325 they pale before
its habitual unwillingness to consider how profoundly the taxing and
regulatory powers of the state can interfere with free exercise in its
fullest sense. 326
It does not seem plausible that the logistics of incorporation alone
can explain this continuous pattern of oversight. After all, associational freedoms have been recognized, to some degree, in other constitutional areas. 327 The fact is that in the chunk-by-chunk process of
interpreting the Bill of Rights, some chunks have received more attention than others. The fate of the Religion Clause at the hands of many
judges and scholars thus may reflect the legal community's implicit
hierarchy among rights. To most contemporary lawyers, it seems fair
to say, the mention of the First Amendment evokes, first and foremost, free speech. Indeed, in everyday legal 'parlance, the First
Amendment is virtually synonymous with speech. This ha~it seems to
go beyond mere mental and verbal shorthand. When Justice Cardozo
committed the Court in Palko v. Connecticut to the proposition that
some rights were more important than others, he mentioned religion
as being in the preferred category, but his chief examples of important
rights were freedom of speech and thought. 328 Today, Laurence Tribe
speaks for many in the legal world when he describes the freedom of
speech as "the Constitution's most majestic guarantee." 329 There is
also a large following, especially in the academy, for Justice Brandeis'
claim that "the right most valued by civilized men" is "the right to be
let alone," the right of privacy. 330 Some commentators have conflated
the freedom of religion with other First Amendment rights as a form
of expression, or referred to it obliquely as freedom of conscience. 331
The scant space accorded to First Amendment religion issues in constitutional law texts and casebooks provides further evidence of an implicit ranking of constitutional values in which protection of religious
325. See McConnell, supra note 152; see also Judge Noonan's dissenting opinion in EEOC v.
Townley Engg. & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 622, 625-29 (9th Cir. 1988), cataloging the instances in
which free exercise claims have been rejected by the federal courts.
326. See especially Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990); Texas
Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471
U.S. 290 (1985). Douglas Laycock has commented that Swaggart culminates the line of cases
"that savages the rights of churches as social groups or mediating institutions." Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty, GEO. WASH. L. REV.
(forthcoming).
327. E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371U.S.415, 428-29 (1963) (stating that activities of NAACP
"are modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments").
328. 302 U.S. 319, 324, 327 (1937).
329. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 785.
330. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
331. See, e.g., ARCHIBALD Cox, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 1 (1981).
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freedom does not enjoy high standing. 332
Related, probably, to the relatively low priority that religious freedom seems to enjoy in the interpretive community of lawyers is a
widely accepted set of assumptions about religion. The ideas that religion is "wholly private," 333 "an individual experience," 334 or that a
religion "worthy of respect" is the product of an individual's
"choice" 335 made it difficult for those who adhered to them to attend
to the associational, institutional, and ecological dimensions of Religion Clause cases.
A constitutional scholar of the critical theory school acknowledged
in 1986 that "[c]ontemporary constitutional law just does not know
how to handle problems of religion." 336 This unusual awkwardness on
the part of legal elites with regard to issues of great moment to the
overwhelming majority of our country's citizens337 seems partially explainable in relation to the hierarchy of constitutional values and the
assumptions about religion mentioned above. American church-state
law also has been deeply affected, however, by a cognitive problem
that is pervasive in contemporary legal culture. Religion Clause jurisprudence is a veritable museum of examples of the inability of a conceptual apparatus geared only to the individual, the state, and the
market to take account of the social dimensions of human personhood,
and of the social environments that individual human beings require in
order to fully develop their potential. 338 Lawyers, who are trained to
operate within the individual-state-market framework, have simply
tended to take for granted the crisscrossing networks of associations
and relationships that constitute the warp and woof of civil society.
Thus, it is not surprising that scholars and judges in the 1950s and
1960s, in their zeal to increase legal protection for certain preferred
liberties, gave little thought to the social costs they might be inflicting
332. See the survey provided by Douglas Laycock, Reflections on Two Themes: Teaching
Religious Liberty and Evolutionary Changes in Casebooks, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1642, 1643 n.6
(1988) (book review). The apparent attitudes of scholars diverge markedly from what opinion
polls reveal about views in the population generally. Most American men and women still place
the freedom of speech exactly where the Framers of the Bill of Rights placed it, very close to, but
just behind, the free exercise of religion. ROBERT 0. WYATT, FREE EXPRESSION AND THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC 10 (1991).
333. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 39 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
334. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
335. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 (1985) (Stevens, J.).
336. Tushnet, supra note 9, at 702.
337. In 1991, the broadest and most comprehensive survey of religious attitudes ever undertaken in the United States showed that over 90% of Americans identify themselves as belonging
to a religion. Ari S. Goldman, Portrait of Religion in U.S. Holds Dozens of Surprises, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 10, 1991, at Al.
338. See generally GLENDON, supra note 36, at ch. 5.
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on structures that help to create a culture in which human rights and
dignity will be respected.
To pin so many hopes in this regard on the public schools, as some
of the Justices seem to have done, was not only to overlook the potential for tyranny in state control of education, but to underestimate seriously the extent to which the public schools themselves depended, and
still depend, on the support of and interaction with families and surrounding communities. Today, social conditions make it impossible to
continue ignoring that these social environments - families, workplace associations, neighborhoods, religious associations - like our
natural environment, are not in peak condition. It is no longer, and
indeed never was, just a few small and relatively self-contained communities like the Amish or the Native Americans who are threatened
by modem society's "hydraulic" pressures toward conformity. 339
Parental concern at the grass-roots level about education has been
a major factor in interfaith cooperation over the years. The primary
initiators of challenges to the state's monopoly over education are not
organized religions, but parents who increasingly sense that they are
losing the struggle for the hearts and minds of their own children.
Interfaith cooperation and support for family and student aid, as distinct from direct aid to schools, belies the notion that experiments
along these lines would lead to civil strife and chaos. A 1987 Harvard
Law Review survey of recent developments in church-state law reported that the Court has ceased to evoke political divisiveness as a
reason for policing the boundaries between religion and public life. 340
Upholding a state tax exemption for private school parents in Mueller
v. Allen, the Court remarked, "At this point in the 20th century we are
quite far removed from the dangers that prompted the Framers to include the Establishment Clause in the Bill of Rights.... The risk of
... deep political division along religious lines ... is remote ...." 341
C. Prospects for a Structural Approach
Though a long overdue reconsideration of Religion Clause jurisprudence from the foundations might seem improbable after all these
years, we believe the current Court's thinking could well lead in that
direction. Six of the present Justices are on record as dissatisfied with
Lemon v. Kurtzman's attempt to place mortar in the crumbling wall of
339. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 217 (1972) (Burger, C.J.)
340. See Developments in the Law, supra note 9, at 1685-86.
341. 463 U.S. 388, 400 (1983) (quoting Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 263 (1977) (Powell,
J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part)).
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separation. 342 Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree
provides a sound historical basis for tackling the neglected questions. 343 Justice White, who joined in that dissent, has pronounced
himself ready on several occasions for "a basic reconsideration of our
precedents. " 344
That several members of the Court are already reaching toward a
holistic approach to the text suggests that such a basic overhaul might
well proceed along structural lines. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy,
for example, have tended to treat both religion provisions as in the
service of religious liberty, though they are not in accord with what
should follow from such a reading. Justice Scalia's opinion for the
Court in Employment Division v. Smith, moreover, reveals a majority
ready to take account of the interplay among the various parts of the
Bill of Rights, specifically, the ways in which one constitutional value
can be amplified or muted by its association with other constitutional
values. 345 What Scalia referred to as "hybrid" cases requiring a higher
level of scrutiny were those in which the plaintiffs' claims seemed especially strong because they were supported by mutually reinforcing
constitutional rights. 346 The explicit connection Scalia recognized between the right of free exercise and the right of association may foreshadow a more capacious and less individualistic view of free exercise
rights than that which has long prevailed on the Court.3 47
A structural approach to free exercise problems would not render
the issues in future cases easy of resolution, but it would provide a
more principled and adequately complex framework for dealing with
them than the rigid approaches of the past. It would be markedly
superior to complete deference, which purchases coherence and clarity, but at the price of a constitutional right. Akhil Amar has proposed another "clean solution," namely to treat the Fourteenth
Amendment as "incorporating free exercise, but not establishment,
342. See supra note 258.
343. See supra notes 31-35, 298-306 and accompanying text.
344. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (White, J., dissenting).
345. 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1601-02 (1990); see supra notes 223-29 and accompanying text.
346. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944);
Cantwell v. Connecticut 310 U.S. 276 (1940); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943);
310 U.S. 296 (1940); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
347. Smith, 1IO S. Ct. at 1602: "[l]t is easy to envision a case in which a challenge on
freedom of association grounds would likewise be reinforced by Free Exercise concerns." In
support, Justice Scalia quoted Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1983): "An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to
petition the government ... could not be vigorously protected from interference by the State [if]
a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed." 468
U.S. at 622.
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principles against state govemments."348 The problem with such a solution, however, is that, like the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
that has been proposed in reaction to Smith, 349 it would perpetuate the
spurious distinction between establishment and free exercise, making
outcomes depend on a classification that is inherently arbitrary. If a
coherent and principled approach is desired, there thus seems to be no
way to avoid coming to grips with basic questions about the meaning
and purpose of the Religion Clause in the light of text and tradition. 350
Another range of thorny problems arises from the fact that free
exercise, like any other right, cannot be unlimited. Institutional, associational, and individual free exercise rights, like other rights, will
sometimes be in tension with each other and with other important
constitutional values. The major interpretive challenge for the future,
we believe, will be to accord as much scope as possible to the constitutional guarantee of free exercise in its personal, associational, and institutional dimensions, while respecting the freedom of conscience of
nonbelievers and without preferring one religion to another. A virtue
of a structural approach to that formidable task is that it points toward addressing problems of fairness to all Americans, whatever their
beliefs, through considering the complex interplay among free exercise, free speech, and equal protection principles, rather than through
rigid, mechanical separationism.
Not the least of the advantages of a holistic approach to these most
delicate of problems is that fairness and tolerance enjoy a legitimacy
among the population at large that crude separationism has never
commanded. The Court's precedents contain much that will continue
to be valuable here, for Court majorities have always vigorously expounded the importance of evenhanded treatment of all religions, and
have always been solicitous of the freedom of conscience of
nonbelievers. 351
A structural approach to Religion Clause jurisprudence also will
afford an occasion to provide the attention to mediating structures
that Chief Justice Rehnquist called for in his Miami lecture. Recognizing the artificiality of the distinction between establishment and
free exercise, the Court should now be able to use the sophisticated
understanding of religion and public life it has been developing in es-

348.
349.
350.
351.

Amar, supra note 25, at 1159.
The Act is described in Gaffney et al., supra note 203, at 44.
Cf Mansfield, supra note 26.
See Developments in the Law, supra note 9, at 1693.
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tablishment cases like Mueller v. Allen 352 and Bowen v. Kendrick 353 in
addressing the associational and institutional dimensions of those disputes that have been labeled as free exercise cases. Here, the precedents contain rich resources in the form of principles that await
amplification and broader application. For example, Chief Justice
Burger in Yoder, and Justice Brennan on several occasions, stressed
the importance of "creat[ing] ... an atmosphere in which voluntary
religious exercise may flourish." 354 Justice Brennan, especially, wrote
perceptively about the way in which protecting the autonomy of religious organizations protects the individual religious freedom of their
members. 355 It only remains for the current Court to accord such protection to the members of all religions, large and small.
CONCLUSION

The recent Religion Clause cases show a Court majority earnestly
beginning to struggle with the formidable and long-neglected interpretive difficulties of the Constitution's religion language. These Justices'
rejection of mechanical separation and their acceptance of structural
premises hold out the promise of a principled and workable approach
to protecting the free exercise of religion in a complex, modern, pluralistic society. Pressures for simplicity and administrative convenience
nudge the Court, on the one hand, toward mechanical deference and a
degree of "unincorporation." A renewed respect for the cautious techniques of common law judging, on the other, tends to perpetuate
separationism through the elaboration of deeply flawed precedents.
The common law tradition does afford a lawyerly path through the
difficulties - a structural approach that begins with text, history, and
tradition, and that can, indeed must, be developed case by case in the
light of present-day circumstances. Whether the Justices will unite in
forging an approach along these lines, and whether they will restore
religion to its rightful place in the first rank of freedoms remains to be
seen.
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